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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-109(1)
(1) Except as otherwise specifically set forth in this chapter,
neither the members, the managers, nor the employees of a
limited liability company are personally liable under a
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner,
for a debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability
company.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-l 12:
A member of a limited liability company is not a proper party
to proceedings by or against a limited liability company,
except when the object is to enforce a member's right against,
or liability to, the limited liability company.
Utah Code of Judicial Admin., Rule 4-505(1):
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be
filed with the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for
the award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney,
the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment,
or the time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which
attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the
fees for comparable legal services.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Defendant Thomas K. Sieg ("Mr. Sieg") owned certain real property located at 273
N. East Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property"), otherwise known as the Wolf
Mansion. Sometime in or about early 1997, Mr. Sieg was approached by a Mr. Rick

Nossier ("Nossier") as to whether he would be willing to sell the property. Mr. Sieg
agreed, and entered into a listing agreement and agency disclosure on or about February
7, 1977 ("listing agreement") listing the property for sale with Coldwell Banker, the
predecessor-in-interest of Premier Van Shaack, Inc. ("Premier"), and granting Premier an
exclusive right to sell the property during the one year term of the listing agreement.
Prior to Nossier contacting Mr. Sieg, Michael G. Davis ("Davis") contacted Nossier
and expressed his interest in purchasing the property, but realized that he did not have the
financial resources to purchase the property.

Davis contacted Marion C. Vaughn

("Vaughn") and Jane E. Johnson ("Johnson") to join him as co-purchasers of the property.
Davis, Vaughn and Johnson, as co-purchasers, entered into a real estate purchase contract
with Mr. Sieg but were unable to procure financing despite their best efforts and several
extensions by Mr. Sieg.
After failure of financing, Davis approached Mr. Sieg with a proposal to create a
venture to turn the property into a bed and breakfast. The proposition was that Mr. Sieg
would make a capital contribution of his property to a limited liability company and would
receive a priority return from any profits until his capital contribution was repaid and
thereafter receive a percentage of the profits.
The MJTM, LLC ("MJTM") was organized as the entity to run the bed and
breakfast and as the entity to receive Mr. Sieg's capital investment. Mr. Sieg's capital
contribution was considered to be $670,000 with MJTM assuming an amount equal to
$580,000 in prior encumbrances. On or about September 26, 1997, the MJTM Operating
2

Agreement was executed which set forth the terms of the venture. Three and one-half
months after the execution of the Operating Agreement, MJTM borrowed $1.143 million
from Zions First National Bank ("Zions") against the property as and for construction and
operating expenses. The construction loan subsumed the existing purchase mortgage on the
property in an amount of approximately $300,000. A week after the construction loan, Mr.
Sieg conveyed the property to MJTM by warranty deed.
The bed and breakfast never became profitable and was in fact never opened to the
public. On or about February 9,1999, MJTM was officially dissolved and the property was
conveyed back to Mr. Sieg and Mr. Sieg subsequently sold the property to B&B Associates
on or about February 18, 1999.
B,

Course of Proceedings.

Premier filed its complaint on or about March 2, 1999 and moved for summary
judgment on its claim. R. at 1-4; 53. Premier argued that Mr. Sieg conveyed the property
to MJTM and received benefits which entitled Premier to a commission under the listing
agreement. R. at 62-67. Mr. Sieg responded to Premier's filing and made his own motion
for summary judgment. R. at 233. Mr. Sieg argued that the transfer was not a sale or
exchange as contemplated in the listing agreement, that there was no ready, willing and
able buyer located, and that Mr. Sieg received no valuable recompense for his transfer. R.
at 265-48. Premier moved to strike the portions of Mr. Sieg's affidavit, Davis's affidavit
and Victor R. Ayer's ("Ayers") affidavit as contradictory to the terms of the Operating
Agreement. R. at 279-80; 283-85.
3

C.

Disposition Below.

In an Order dated September 6, 2000, as supplemented by its Minute Entry dated
December 7, 2000, the district court denied Premier's motion for summary judgment and
granted Mr. Sieg's motion for summary judgment. R. at 382-83; 385. The district court
further denied Premier's motion to strike portions of the affidavits of Mr. Sieg, Davis, and
Ayers. R. at 383. The district court also awarded Mr. Sieg his attorney fees in the amount
of $23,242.77. R. at 383; 385.
D.

Reply to Appellant's Statement of Facts

Premier's paragraph 5. It is true that the proposed purchasers, Marion Vaughn, Jane
Johnson and Michael Davis (MJM of MJTM), were never able to close on their real estate
purchase contract with Mr. Sieg, but it is also important to note that the reason they never
closed was their failure individually and collectively to secure financing despite their best
efforts, including several extensions. R. at 255-56.
Premier's paragraph 8. Premier attempts to make the connection, since the
conveyance of the property to MJTM was "approximately contemporaneous" with the
$1,413 million construction loan, that this loan was somehow related to the consideration
Premier claims to be set forth in the Operating Agreement.1 It is the Operating Agreement
that sets forth the terms of Mr. Sieg's contribution of the property and it is the Operating
Agreement wherein Mr. Sieg obligates himself to convey the property to MJTM. Further,
the Operating Agreement never refers to the procurement of a construction loan. The
1

The full text of the Operating Agreement, although burdensome, is attached
hereto for the Court's ease of reference.
4

Operating Agreement was signed by the parties on September 26, 1997, and the
construction loan was executed, more than three and one-half months later, on January 14,
1998. R. at 170;175-85. If consideration existed for the conveyance of the property, it
existed only under the terms of the Operating Agreement and at the time of its execution.
The fact that MJTM executed the construction loan on January 14, 1998 and that Mr. Sieg
conveyed his property to MJTM "approximately contemporaneously" (in fact, the
conveyance was a week after the loan) is irrelevant to whether consideration existed in the
Operating Agreement three and one-half months earlier. R. at 174-77. Certainly, no bank
is going to loan $1,413 million to a limited liability company with no assets, but Zions
made the loan to an asset free MJTM in this case because Mr. Sieg was obligated by the
terms of the Operating Agreement to contribute the property to MJTM. Thus, the time of
conveyance is immaterial because Mr. Sieg was obligated to convey in the Operating
Agreement almost four months earlier, and any consideration for the conveyance must
necessarily have been set forth in the Operating Agreement.
E.

Additional Undisputed and Material Facts

1.

The Operating Agreement states, with regard to the withdrawal of capital

contributions, "no member shall be personally liable to any other member for the return of
any part of the member's capital contributions." Operating Agreement, Article 6.3; R. at
132.
2.

Upon dissolution and termination of MJTM, the Operating Agreement states,
[e]ach Member shall look solely to the assets of the Company
and the Company property remaining after the payment or
discharge of the debts and liabilities of the Company to the
5

Member. If such assets and property are insufficient to return
the capital contributions of each Member, the Members shall
have no recourse against any other Member ...
Operating Agreement, Article 13.6; R. at 159.
3.

In its Representations of Members, the Operating Agreement describes the

members involvement as solely an "investment," and spells out that the members
understand "the possible complete loss of all contributed capital." Operating Agreement,
Article 18; R. at 167.
4.

Throughout the operating term of MJTM, Mr. Sieg paid the three (3) other

members a salary for their personal services to the venture. R. at 84; 102; 106; 109.
5.

The Operating Agreement contemplated that no member other than Mr. Sieg

would make a capital contribution to the company in the form of cash or property, and such
other members would, therefore, acquire no interest in the capital of the company at
formation. R. at 303, f 7.
6.

Under the Operating Agreement, the members, other than Mr. Sieg, could

have received an interest in the capital of the company only through contributions of capital
or profitable operations of the company. R. at 304, ^f 16.
7.

The wording of the Operating Agreement was intended to accomplish the

following goals:
(1)

Avoid payment of tax by members other than Mr. Sieg upon receipt

by such members of an interest in company profits in exchange for promises of
services to be performed in the future, and
6

(2)

To avoid transfer of capital from Mr. Sieg to other members.

R. at 305, U 29.
8.

It was the understanding of the members of MJTM that MJTM did not

purchase the property from Mr. Sieg nor exchange anything for the property. R. at 257, ^J
5. Mr. Sieg was the only member to place assets at risk and the minority members
understood that if the company would be dissolved for any reason prior to becoming
profitable, Mr. Sieg's capital contribution would be returned to him undisturbed by any
interest of the other members of MJTM. R. at 258, Tf 6.
9.

Mr. Sieg did not, in fact, receive any compensation for his capital

contribution, nor was he relieved of any debt at any time. R. at 259-60, ^s 5 and 7.
10.

It is the expert opinion of Victor R. Ayers, who has been a licensed real estate

agent in the State of Utah for forty-one (41) years and a licensed real estate broker in the
State of Utah for thirty-eight (38) years, that Mr. Sieg's transfer of property to MJTM did
not at any point rise to the level of sale, lease or exchange as contemplated in the listing
agreement. R. at 262; 325. It is the opinion of Mr. Ayers that no ready, willing and able
buyer was located at any time. R. at 262; 325. It is also the opinion of Mr. Ayers that a
sales price cannot be determined upon which to base a commission. R. at 325.
11.

The members were entitled to annual compensation in the amount of $25,000

in the Operating Agreement. Operating Agreement, Article 9,7; R. at 143.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The issue in this matter is whether Mr. Sieg's transfer of his property to MJTM
7

constituted a sale or exchange of his property which would subject him to the payment of
a commission under Premier's listing agreement. The trial court found that Mr. Sieg's
transfer lacked consideration and granted Mr. Sieg's request for summary judgment on this
ground. However, Mr. Sieg made several varying arguments below to show that no sale or
exchange occurred and recognizes that this court may affirm the trial court's conclusion on
any legal grounds. "An appellate court may affirm a 'judgment, order, or decree appealed
from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,' even though
that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Orton
v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254,1260 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). The Operating Agreement
lacked sufficient consideration to be legally enforceable by a non-contracting third party.
The mere recital of supposed benefits to be received by Mr. Sieg for the transfer of his
property to MJTM, without a factual showing by Premier that Mr. Sieg was conferred a
legally enforceable benefit, does not constitute valid consideration. Although MJTM
assumed $580,000 of debt associated with the property, the members of MJTM did not
personally guarantee the debt, nor had they any obligation to contribute assets to MJTM,
and therefore the debt relief was illusory in that the only asset of MJTM was Mr. Sieg's
property. Further, Mr. Sieg's interest in MJTM and priority return was not consideration
as neither MJTM nor its members were bound to provide Mr. Sieg a return on his
investment. In fact, the Operating Agreement explicitly states that any contributing
member risks the total loss of his investment.
Premier relies on the mere wording of its listing agreement and the MJTM
8

Operating Agreement to show the intentions of the parties. However, it is clear from the
wording of the Operating Agreement that Mr. Sieg's capital contribution was an investment
with a risk of the total loss of that investment, and not a sale or exchange as intended in the
listing agreement. Instead of selling his property, Mr. Sieg decided to develop his property,
and if Premier intended, under its listing agreement, to earn a commission upon the location
of a development or investment opportunity, it should have so stated. Premier is a
sophisticated party and the contracts it prepares and operates under will be strictly
construed against it as the drafter. In short, the explicit terms of the Operating Agreement
control, and the transfer of Mr. Sieg's property to MJTM was explicitly an investment and
not a sale or exchange entitling Premier to a commission.
There was no ready, willing and able purchaser located during the term of the listing
agreement, and this is a condition precedent under the listing agreement to Premier earning
a commission. Although Mr. Sieg concedes, for purposes of this argument, that a limited
liability company is a separate entity from its members, a limited liability company does
not magically infuse its members with the requisite assets necessary to make a purchase of
$1.3 million. The only member of MJTM that had adequate resources to qualify as an able
buyer would have been Mr. Sieg, and it is axiomatic that he cannot buy property he already
owns. The other members had collectively and undisputedly failed to qualify financially
for such a purchase. Thus, the condition precedent fails, because Premier cannot point to
a purchaser, other than Mr. Sieg, that had sufficient assets to respond in damages if the
supposed purchase failed.
9

Mr. Sieg's final substantive argument is that Premier has failed at all times to put
forth an acquisition price which is required under the listing agreement. The acquisition
price would be the value of the consideration received, and Premier has at no time
attempted to value the consideration Mr. Sieg is alleged to have received in this case.
Premier merely recites that since the parties agreed the property was worth $1.3 million,
it must have been sold for that amount. Even Premier's own cited authority argues against
this position, and thus Premier has failed in showing an acquisition price upon which to
determine a commission.
Thus, and for any and all of the above stated reasons, this court should affirm the
ruling of the district court and remand with instructions to determine reasonable attorney
fees and costs to be awarded Mr. Sieg for the necessity of defending this appeal.
ARGUMENT
I
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR MR. SIEG'S
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION BECAUSE THE DEBT
RELIEF WAS ILLUSORY AND THE INTEREST IN
MJTM WAS SPECULATIVE
As set forth in pleadings and in argument for summary judgment, Mr. Sieg has
argued that the alleged debt relief was illusory as there were no assets in MJTM besides
those he contributed. Mr. Sieg has further argued that the supposed benefit of his interest
in MJTM and priority return were similarly illusory benefits in so far as they were
speculative and MJTM made no binding promise of profitability. The trial court agreed
with these arguments. R. at 336; 385.
10

It is well settled that "[t]he law does not enforce all promises. For a promise to be
legally enforceable, it must be supported by consideration." Resource Management Co. v.
Weston Ranch. 706 P.2d 1028,1036 (Utah 1985), citing, Manwill v. Ovler. 361 P.2d 177,
178 (Utah 1961); 17 CJS Contracts § 71 (1963). The Utah Supreme Court in Weston
Ranch then goes on to define consideration as an act or promise bargained for and given
in exchange for a promise. Id., at 1036, citing Simmons v. California Institute of
Technology. 209 P.2d 581, 586 (Cal. 1949); Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Bohm.
286 F.2d 494, 496 (9th Cir. 1961). Finally, the Weston Ranch court states,
[f]or the mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral contract
to constitute the consideration for each other, the promises
must be binding on both parties.
Id., at 1036 (emphasis added); citing Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin. 1 F.2d 687, 688
(3d Cir. 1924). To bind a party means to obligate a party or to place a party under a
definite duty or legal obligation. Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition.
Premier cites Hagan v. Adams Prop Assocs., 253 Va. 217,482 S.E. 2d 805 (Virginia
1997) as its dispositive case on whether consideration existed for Mr. Sieg's capital
contribution. However, whether there was real consideration or illusory promises is largely
a factual determination and Hagan provides us no factual insights, except for the factually
dissimilar and real benefit to the putative seller of a guaranteed second deed of trust which
the seller received from the limited liability company ("HPT") in the amount of $323,000.
All the Hagan case really does is provide authority for the fact that a sale may take place
by a transfer of property to a limited liability company. This point has been largely
11

conceded by Mr. Sieg (See Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City
Knee & Sports Medicine. 909 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)), and his position is not that
a sale could not occur in this scenario, but that a sale did not occur. The facts are such that
Mr. Sieg received no consideration for his capital contribution to MJTM, and it was
therefore not a sale. If MJTM had assets beyond Mr. Sieg's capital contribution or the
members had undertaken an obligation to personally assume the debt or to contribute assets
besides Mr. Sieg's capital contribution, then an exchange for consideration may have
transpired.
The Hagan court's mere recital of the fact that Hagan received debt relief is of no
avail. There is no statement of the factual circumstances surrounding the transfer. It is
critical to note, when examining Hagan, that the court found Hagan received debt relief
"under the terms of the operating agreement." Thus, Hagan is not helpful unless one
examines the operating agreement in effect in that case (the HPT operating agreement).
Certainly, the obligations defined under the HPT operating agreement would control
whether the debt relief was real or illusory. If HPT had assets other than Hagan's capital
contribution, or the operating agreement set forth an obligation on the other members to
transfer assets, or the other members personally assumed the debt in the operating
agreement, then it would have provided Hagan real debt relief.2
2

In fact, Mr Sieg believes the Hagan decision actually hurts Premier's position.
The Hagan court limited the commission earned to 1) the debt relief Hagan was found to
have received, and 2) the second deed of trust which was a guaranteed benefit. It ascribed
no value to the percentage interest he received in HPT as a result of his capital
contribution. Thus, under Hagan, Premier's request for a commission on the "agreed"
value of the property ($1.3 million), without more, is entirely misplaced.
12

Premier argues that the debt assumed by MJTM in the amount of $580,000 was a
benefit to Mr. Sieg and a promise to which MJTM was bound, and thus consideration
passed for the debt relief However, under the Operating Agreement, no other member of
MJTM undertook a personal obligation on the debt, or an obligation to make a capital
contribution to MJTM. In fact, page fifty-one (51) of the Operating Agreement clearly sets
forth the capital contributions of the members: to wit, Marion Vaughn contributed $0, Jane
Johnson contributed $0, Mike Davis contributed $0, and Tom Sieg contributed $670,000.
R. at 173. Since the purpose of a limited liability company is to shield its individual
members from personal liability on any action against the limited liability company, and
since it clearly states in the Operating Agreement that no member shall be personally liable
to any other member for the return of any part of Mr. Sieg's capital contribution, this debt
relief is an illusion.3 See R. at 132; Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2b-109(l), -112 (Supp. 2000).
Thus, without a corresponding obligation by the members of MJTM to individually assume
the debt, or make a capital contribution, the debt relief is illusory and cannot be
consideration for Mr. Sieg's capital contribution. For purposes of this argument, Mr. Sieg

3

Premier would also argue that the subsequent construction loan worked a benefit
to Mr. Sieg in the assumption of a purchase mortgage in the amount of $300,000.
However, such an argument is not only improper bootstrapping as set forth in Mr. Sieg's
Reply to Premier's Statement of Facts set forth herein, but it is also easily shown not to
benefit Mr. Sieg. The construction loan merely increases Mr. Sieg's debt basis while not
changing the asset configuration of MJTM. In other words, the purchase mortgage was
merely subsumed by the construction loan so Zions would be in first position, and should
the loan be called due, MJTM's only chargeable asset to the creditor would remain the
capital contribution of Mr. Sieg. Further, he remains personally liable as a guarantor for
the entire amount of the $1,413 million construction loan, as Premier admits in its Brief.
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will concede that if there was an obligation set forth in the operating agreement on the other
members of MJTM to personally assume the debt, or to contribute capital, there could be
a benefit in the form of debt relief to Mr. Sieg. However, it is apparent from the wording
of the Operating Agreement that it was specifically drafted not to obligate any other
members to personally assume or contribute capital. R. at 305-06.
Premier would next argue that Mr. Sieg received consideration in the form of a 40%
interest in MJTM and a 9% priority return to the amount of his capital contribution, and
while Premier admits that MJTM does not guarantee profitability, Premier argues the
members are impliedly bound to use best efforts to accomplish the purpose of the
agreement, which would presumably be profitability. For this proposition, Premier cites
Woodv. Duff Gordon. 222 N.Y. 88, 90-91 (N.Y. 1917) and Non-Linear Tradine Co. v.
Braddis Assocs.. 243 A.D.2d 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). The critical difference between
those cases and the instant case is, in Duff Gordon and Non-Linear Trading, the parties
seeking relief from the contract were actually contracting parties, and it is well settled that
courts prefer to enforce contracts between parties that have indicated their intent to be
bound. This policy protects from "arbitrary action by one party that disadvantages the
other." Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch. 706 P.2d at 1037. The policy is
favored because it prevents parties from entering contracts and using them to their
unilateral benefit while feeling they can arbitrarily terminate the contract due to lack of
mutuality. In other words, if the deal goes bad, or one party determines it no longer desires
to be bound, courts will generally enforce contracts between contracting parties for strong
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policy reasons. See Duff-Gordon; Non-Linear Trading Co.
In this case, neither Mr. Sieg, MJTM, nor any of its members had any desire to
disavow the Operating Agreement. The parties intended to be bound at all times and Mr.
Sieg has made no objection at any time to the Operating Agreement or its effectiveness as
a contract. This is not a case where a contracting party is trying to get out of a contract to
the other party's detriment. This is a case where Premier, a non-contracting third party, is
trying to enforce a contract that was never contested by the contracting parties. In effect,
Premier is attempting to prove consideration with a theoretical legal argument one of the
contracting parties might make to preserve its own contract. Implied promises are a legal
tool to support "apparently illusory promise[s]" when it appears "the [contracting] parties
intended a contract." Joseph M. Perillo & Helen H. Bender, Corbin on Contracts § 5.28,
at 149-50 (rev. Ed. 1995). Simply put, the policy concerns are not at all the same in this
case as in Duff-Gordon or Non-Linear Trading Co.
It is also important to note that even if Premier's argument for implied good faith
efforts are accepted, there is still no legal obligation of MJTM to become profitable. In the
express, not implied, language of the Operating Agreement, Mr. Sieg understood that his
transfer was a total risk and that his entire capital contribution could be lost. R. at 167.
Therefore, the supposed bargained for benefit of a 40% interest in MJTM and priority
return is explicitly speculative and conditional, and not a real, actionable benefit.
Obviously, the parties are free to enter any type of contract they desire, and a
contract to give an outright gift from one party to the other will be a valid and enforceable
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contract so long as the parties to the contact choose to be bound by it. Thus, it avails
Premier naught to show the Operating Agreement was valid and enforceable, because it
was valid and enforceable, even lacking consideration, because the parties chose to make
it so.
Premier also argues that Mr. Sieg benefitted because MJTM promised to provide the
services necessary to turn MJTM into a profitable venture. While this is an aspect of the
implied promise of good faith argument, the argument fails because Mr. Sieg paid salaries
to all other members of MJTM for their services. R. at 84; 102; 106; 109. Therefore, Mr.
Sieg received no benefit under the operating agreement. He compensated the other
members for their services, just as he would have compensated independent contractors for
their services. This fact further supports the argument, above, that although the Operating
Agreement was enforceable because the parties intended to comply with its provisions, the
interests granted to the other members of MJTM were in effect a gift to them and no
consideration was exchanged.
Finally, it is Premier's burden to show that there was consideration for Mr. Sieg's
capital contribution, and they have failed in that burden. The burden of proving a contract
is on the one seeking to recover on the contract, and this includes the burden of proving
consideration. Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1983).
Consideration is a necessary element for a valid agreement and
the burden of showing it is on the one claiming the benefit of
the agreement. Lack of consideration to support the
agreement would be a failure of that party's burden ...
Id, at 40; citing Ennis v. McLaggan, 608 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Mo. App. 1980).
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For Premier to sustain its burden, it would have to show MJTM's assumption of the
debt provided real debt relief to Mr. Sieg or that the interest in the speculative profits of
MJTM provided a binding, enforceable benefit to Mr. Sieg. Factually, either under the
terms of the Operating Agreement, or by extrinsic evidence, Premier would have to show
the members individually undertook the debt, or that MJTM had assets beyond those
contributed by Mr. Sieg, or that MJTM undertook some obligation to contribute capital
other than Mr. Sieg's, or that MJTM guaranteed profitability with some actual remedy
either against MJTM or its other members. Premier does not attempt this showing, it relies
solely on the Operating Agreement's recitation of non-binding, conditional benefits.
Thus, and for the reasons above stated, there is lack of consideration under these
particular factual circumstances for Mr. Sieg's conveyance of the property to MJTM, and
the trial court ruled correctly. Premier's labored legal arguments are insufficient to support
their burden of showing consideration. Premier has relied at all times on the mere wording
of the Operating Agreement and its description of supposed benefits; but without facts
showing that any enforceable benefit was actually conferred to Mr. Sieg, or that any
binding obligations were made, Premier's arguments fail and no commission was earned.
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II
PREMIER DID NOT EARN A COMMISSION
BECAUSE MR. SIEG'S CONTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL
WAS AN INVESTMENT OF HIS CAPITAL, NOT A
SALE OR EXCHANGE AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE
LISTING AGREEMENT
It is hornbrook contract law that the intentions of the parties to the contract control,
and unless there is ambiguity on the face of the contract, the written contract will determine
the intentions of the parties.
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are
controlling. If the contract is in writing and the language is not
ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined
from the words of the agreement. A Court may only consider
extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract
language is ambiguous or uncertain. A contract provision is
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms,
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.' Whether
ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law.
Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991), citations omitted. Premier has
made no attempt at any time to provide extrinsic evidence as to the intentions of the parties
under the listing agreement, and Premier therefore relies on the strict wording of the listing
agreement. The listing does not define sale or exchange, and thus, the "plain and ordinary
meaning" of the words controls as to the intention of the contracting parties. Hall v.
Process Instruments & Control Inc., 866 P.2d 604,606 (Utah App. 1993), Affd, 890 P.2d,
1024 (Utah 1995). Further, contracts will be construed against the drafter. See Cherry v.
Utah State University. 966 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah App. 1998).
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It seems obvious that the plain and ordinary meaning of sale is that seller gets
binding pecuniary benefit, or its equivalent, for the sale of property, and in the case of
exchange, the seller would have a tax free exchange of property for property (IRC § 1031
(1986)) either binding or immediate. Either way, the seller under a standard listing
agreement would expect to receive some guaranteed, non-speculative and non-illusory,
purchase price for his property. If Premier intended a commission to be earned on locating
other types of transactions, it could have and should have so defined them.
It has been held, in cases with very similar facts, that it is the broker's burden to
show that a sale took place as contemplated in the listing agreement with sufficient
corresponding indicia of a plain and ordinary sale or exchange. In Dahdah v. Continent
Realty Inc., 434 So.2d 997 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1983), the seller (Dahdah) entered into an
agreement with a broker to pay a 10% commission if the broker located a ready and willing
purchaser of the property on terms acceptable to the seller. The broker brought a buyer to
the seller, but the buyer was not in a financial position to purchase. Months later, the seller
and putative buyer entered into an agreement to develop the seller's property into thirtyfour (34) housing units with the putative buyer to act as the construction manager. Under
the agreement, seller and putative buyer were then to receive equal profits after the seller
was reimbursed the value of his property. The broker in Dahdah argues that the agreement
between the seller and putative buyer constituted a sale, and the court found that no sale
was contemplated in their development agreement, nor was any compensation guaranteed
the seller.
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The brokerage contract provided for a commission upon the
sale of the property. This exclusive right of sale contract,
however, did not define the term 'sale.' ... Rather than
assuming the risk of a seller, the owner assumed the risk of a
participant in a joint venture with the potential for losses as
well as profits. As such, the owner decided to develop the
property herself.
The exclusive right of sale contract did not address the
situation where the owner develops the property herself in the
form of a joint venture. The exclusive right of sale contract
should be construed against the broker as drafter of the
document. Consequently, if the broker wanted a commission
in the event the owner entered into a joint venture with other
parties regarding the property, the broker should have spelled
that out in the contract.
Dahdah, 434 So.2d at 998, 999; quoting Miller, Cowherd & Kerver. Inc. v. De Montejo.
406 So.2d 1196 (Florida 4th D.C.A. 1981) (wherein, owner, under an exclusive listing,
transferred property to joint venture to develop and received an interest in joint venture
after a priority return to the amount of his contribution); See also McElhinney v. Belsky,
69A.2dl78(Penn. 1949).
Also, in Coolev Inv. Co. v. Jones, 780 P.2d 29 (1989), the Colorado Court of
Appeals found similarly that no sale occurred when the owner transferred her property to
a partnership to develop for profit.
The conveyance of the title to the property to the partnership
cannot be considered to be a 'sale.' Under the agreement
between the defendant and [her partner], defendant received
only a credit for a capital contribution of $500,000, which
represented the market value of the property. She received no
other compensation; there was no unconditional promise on
the part of the partnership, or any one else, to pay her
anything; there was no security given to her; and she was not
entitled to receive any interest payments on her capital
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account. Defendant's only right was to receive a share of
future profits, if any.
Therefore, under the facts here, the conveyance of the
title to the property by defendant to the partnership did not
constitute either a sale or an exchange within the meaning of
the Listing Agreement.
Id, 780 P.2d at 31, citation omitted.4
Thus, only if Premier shows that Mr. Sieg's capital contribution to MJTM was a sale
or exchange in the plain ordinary sense of those terms, can they succeed in showing an
earned commission. Again, in attempting to sustain this burden, Premier makes no attempt
to put forth extrinsic evidence, and relies solely on the wording of the Operating
Agreement for its arguments. However, it is clear by the express wording of the Operating
Agreement that Mr. Sieg's capital contribution was an investment, together with the
inherent risks of an investment, and not a sale or exchange. R. at 167-68. As set forth, the
Operating Agreement clearly defines Mr. Sieg's capital contribution as an investment and
nothing more. In Article 18 Representations of Members it states,
[t]he Member acknowledges and understands that the
company has no financial or operating history and the
Member's interest as an investment involves a high degree of
risk.
The Member acknowledges and understands that there will be
no public market for the Company Interests, that there are
substantial restrictions on the resale, assignment or transfer of
4

Premier dismisses Dahdah, De Montejo and Cooley in its brief for the oversimplified reason that the entity the owners transferred their property to was not a limited
liability company. However, as shown above, these cases are directly on point factually
and are very persuasive with considerations of issues as to why the transaction was not
determined to be a sale. Copies of these cases are attached for ease of reference.
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the Company interests and it will likely not be possible to
readily liquidate the investment of the undersigned in the
Company.
The undersigned has sufficient net worth to bear the risk of the
complete loss of the investment of the undersigned in the
Company.
The Member, by virtue of the Member's own investment
acumen and business experience, is capable of valuing the
risks and merits of investing in the Company.
The Member is purchasing the Company Interests for the
Member's own account for investment purposes and not with
a view to or for any distribution thereof.

The Member is capable of bearing the high degree of
economic risk associated with the investment of the Company,
including the possible complete loss of all contributed capital
and earnings thereon.
Operating Agreement, Article 18; R. at 167-68.
Thus, Premier cannot possibly sustain its burden of showing that Mr. Sieg's
contribution of capital to MJTM was a sale under the listing agreement in its plain and
ordinary sense. Without extrinsic evidence, the Operating Agreement is clear on its face
that the contribution was an investment with risks distinct to an investment and in direct
opposition to the plain and ordinary understanding of a sale or exchange where the seller
would receive a purchase price, and any executory obligations would be secured by a deed
of trust.
The Operating Agreement is unambiguously steeped in language characterizing Mr.
Sieg's contribution as an investment, and spells out that the parties to the Operating
22

Agreement intended an investment as opposed to a sale. R. at 167-68. The listing
agreement will be construed against Premier as its sophisticated drafter, and if Premier
intended its listing agreement to earn it a commission on finding Mr. Sieg an investment
opportunity, it should have stated that specifically in the listing agreement. Thus, since
Premier must show that a sale or exchange occurred in its plain and ordinary meaning,
Premier has failed in its burden of showing that the Operating Agreement effected a sale
or exchange as contemplated in the listing agreement.
Ill
NO READY, WILLING, AND ABLE BUYER WAS
LOCATED AT ANY TIME BY ANY PARTY DURING
THE TERM OF THE LISTING AGREEMENT, AND
THEREFORE A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO
EARNING A COMMISSION WAS NOT MET
The listing agreement states in pertinent part,
If, during the listing period, Coldwell Banker Premier Realty,
the listing agent, the owner, another real estate agent, or
anyone else locates a party that is ready, willing, and able to
buy, lease, or exchange (collectively referred to as 'acquire')
the property or any part thereof at the listing price and terms
stated on the attached board/association property data
information form, or any other price or terms to which the
owner may agree in writing, the owner agrees to pay Coldwell
Banker Premier Realty a brokerage fee of seven percent (7%)
of such acquisition price; ...
R. at 109, ^ 2, emphasis added. Since the listing agreement is worded in such a manner
as to require the location of a ready, willing, and able buyer as a condition precedent to the
earning of a commission, the commission must fail if a ready, willing, and able buyer is not
located.
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It is undisputed that Davis, Vaughn & Johnson were not ready, willing, and able
purchasers at any time, either individually or collectively, during the listing agreement.
Those three prospective purchasers were the only members of MJTM besides Mr. Sieg, and
they had collectively attempted and failed to purchase the property under a real estate
purchase contract for $1.3 million. R. at 112. They were not able to procure financing
despite their several attempts and Mr. Sieg's several extensions. R. at 112-17. Mr. Sieg
has questioned how the inclusion of himself, as owner of the property, to this party of
unqualified purchasers somehow satisfies the condition. R. at 293-94. The limited liability
company does not somehow, in and of itself, infuse its members with assets, or make them
viable purchasers. It does appear to make them a separate entity (See Salt Lake Knee), but
it does not make them able to make a purchase beyond their financial ability.
The theory behind the necessity of a ready, willing, and able purchaser is to secure
the seller. In other words, the seller should not have to pay a commission if the buyer does
not have sufficient net worth to complete the purchase. The policy for requiring a ready,
willing, and able buyer is to avoid having the seller on the line for a commission if he does
not have a good cause of action against the buyer for the supposed fruit of his sale.
The requirement of a ready, willing, and able buyer has been a long-standing
condition to a sale of realty that has become fairly formulaic. Most of the law that speaks
to the condition is therefore older, but still compelling. The California Supreme Court has
held that the requirement of a ready, willing, and able buyer is to protect the seller in the
event the buyer fails to perform. Hersh v. Garau 23 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1933). For this
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proposition the Hersh court cited the earlier case of Laack v. Dimmick. 273 P. 50 (Cal. 2d
D.C.A. 1928), which held,
[t]he true rule in the instant case may be stated as follows: The
purchaser must be able to buy; and the word 'able' means
financially able. This does not mean, however, that such
purchaser must have all the money in his immediate
possession or to his credit at a bank, but only that he must be
able to command the necessary funds to close the deal within
the time required. Even where the purchaser was not
personally able to buy, it was said that 'it is sufficient if [he]
has arranged so that these funds will be available for payment
when the time comes to close a transaction, although part of it
be obtained on the purchased property itself.' It is much more
clearly sufficient if the purchaser has assets of greater value
than the purchase price and a financial rating which will
enable him to command the funds when needed. For in such
event the purchaser is not only able to purchase, but is able to
respond in damages if he refuse to go ahead with the contract.
Laack v. Dimmick, 273 P. at 55 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Utah law has also addressed this condition precedent, and while holding that a
broker is entitled to a commission upon procurement of a binding agreement by a ready,
willing, and able purchaser, the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Mortenson. 267 P.2d 237
(1954), set forth the rationale for this general rule.
It is obvious that the reason this court has stated in the above
cases that a binding agreement or offer of [a ready, willing,
and able] buyer is necessary if a broker is to be entitled to his
commission is to protect the seller from being obligated to pay
a commission where the proposed buyer either cannot or will
not perform and the seller is left without a remedy which can
be enforced against the buyer.
Id, at 238 (emphasis added).
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Utah law also says that it is the broker's burden to show that a proposed purchaser
is ready, willing, and able. In Lewis v. DahL 161 P.2d 362 (1945) the Supreme Court
found that a commission was not earned because the broker failed in its burden to show that
he had located a ready, willing, and able purchaser during the listing agreement or that the
seller had entered into a binding contract during the listing term. Justice Turner, in his
concurring opinion, sets forth the burden as follows:
[t]o recover for performance, plaintiff [broker] would have to
prove by competent, credible evidence that he had a purchaser
who was ready, willing, and able to perform. To recover a
commission for a sale made by the owner, proof of the
transaction necessarily would have to be positive, both
competent and credible, and just as worthy of belief as in the
first instance.
Id, 161P.2dat367.
Premier alleges throughout that Mr. Sieg owes it the commission on a sale of $1.3
million, but has failed to show that MJTM was bound to any performance for this alleged
sale. If MJTM was bound in any way, Premier could point to some security; however,
Premier has failed to allege or show that Mr. Sieg has a good and viable cause of action
against MJTM for anything. Firstly, Mr. Sieg has no viable cause of action against MJTM
to enforce its supposed implied promise of profitability. Secondly, although in theory Mr.
Sieg has a cause of action against MJTM for its assumption of debt, in reality, the cause of
action avails Mr. Sieg nothing because he would be executing against his own capital. As
set forth above, if MJTM had sufficient assets, other than those contributed by Mr. Sieg,
it may be determined to be a ready, willing, and able buyer. However, the facts are clear
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that Mr. Sieg is without a remedy which can be enforced against MJTM to his pecuniary
benefit.
There is additional Utah law which states a purchaser is not ready, willing, and able
to perform if the purchase would be subject to a condition or the purchaser would not be
ready to perform for some time. The Supreme Court stated,
[t]he provision in the broker's listing contract obligates the
owner to pay a commission if a sale is procured or a purchaser
is procured who is ready, able, and willing to perform. That
does not mean a purchaser who will not be ready for some
time nor one who must sell his home first.
Sproul v. Parks, 210 P.2d 436, 438 (1949); citing See Cottingham v. Smith. 82 P.2d 479
(Cal. App. 1938); and Willis v. Page. 65 P.2d 944 (Cal. App. 1937). This means that
Premier would have to show that MJTM was able to perform upon execution of the
Operating Agreement. Obviously, for reasons stated, MJTM could not have performed on
its supposed implied obligation of future profitability, nor could it have provided real debt
relief.
As shown, Premier has not sustained, nor can it sustain, its burden to show that
MJTM was a ready, willing, and able purchaser. MJTM had no assets beyond Mr. Sieg's
capital, and therefore Mr. Sieg had no remedy against MJTM which could justify the
payment of a commission to Premier. Thus, a condition precedent to Premier earning a
commission failed in that no ready, willing, and able purchaser was located at any time
during the listing.
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IV
PREMIER'S CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE PREMIER HAS
NOT PUT FORTH AN ACQUISITION PRICE TO
SUPPORT ITS THEORY OF COMMISSION
Premier seems to imply in its brief that Mr. Sieg consented to the figure of $1.3
million as the acquisition price should Premier somehow succeed in showing it is entitled
to a commission. This position should not require response in light of Mr. Sieg's
continuous position that he received nothing for the transfer. Mr. Sieg did concede that
Premier did the math correctly for seven percent (7%) of $1.3 million, but this concession
was tongue-in-cheek and he conceded nothing else. The record, as well as Mr. Sieg's oral
argument for summary judgment, makes this abundantly clear.
Premier's failure to show an acquisition price is fatal to its claim for recovery of a
commission. It is clearly Premier's burden under the listing agreement to put forth an
acquisition price upon which a commission was earned. Otherwise, Mr. Sieg is in the
curious position of trying to prove a negative, that is, that there was no acquisition price.
The listing agreement, as set forth above, states that if the owner sells at his own price or
terms, "the owner agrees to pay [Premier] a brokerage fee in the amount of seven percent
(7%) of such acquisition price." R. at 109, ^f 2. Merely because the property was valued
at $ 1.3 million does not mean that MJTM purchased it at that amount. Premier would have
to show that Mr. Sieg received value of $1.3 million to prevail on its theory, or point to
some other acquisition price supported by credible evidence, which Premier has not even
attempted.
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Although this proposition seems axiomatic, price is defined as "something which
one ordinarily accepts voluntarily in exchange for something else. The consideration given
for the purchase of a thing." Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition. Assuming Premier's
arguments, the consideration would be the debt relief and the interest in MJTM with a
corresponding preferential return of potential profits. However, Premier assigns no value
to this alleged consideration, and by implication seems to say it must be worth $ 1.3 million.
Even the Hagan case, which Premier relies upon argues against this proposition. The
Hagan case ordered the owner to pay a commission only on what he received, namely, the
value of the debt relief and the second trust deed note which the court found to equal
$1,351,000 of real benefit. The Hagan court found "[t]he gross sales amount is the
consideration which Hagan received from HPT, not an amount agreed upon between some
other buyer and seller at another time." Hagan, 482 S.E.2d at 808. Curiously, Hagan felt
his property was worth $1.6 million. Id., at 806. Mr. Sieg would have sold his property
for $1.3 million, but that does not mean he did sell it for that amount.5
Premier's mere recital that, since the parties agreed the property was worth $1.3
million, Mr. Sieg must have received that amount in consideration for its transfer, is
clearly insufficient. Thus, Premier has failed in its burden to show there was an acquisition
price, and Premier's claim must fail. Further, and in keeping with Mr. Sieg's above

5

This position also argues against Premier's claim for prejudgment interest, in
that, an acquisition price is not adequately set forth, and therefore the loss cannot be
calculated with mathematical accuracy. Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co.. 660 P.2d 229,
233 (Utah 1983).
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arguments, Premier cannot possibly show an acquisition price because the transaction
lacked consideration.
V
MR. SIEG MAY HAVE BREACHED THE LISTING
AGREEMENT BY TAKING HIS PROPERTY OFF THE
MARKET PRIOR TO THE END OF THE LISTING,
BUT PREMIER HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY
DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF THIS POTENTIAL
BREACH AND FAILED TO SET FORTH A CLAIM
UNDER THIS THEORY IN ITS COMPLAINT OR AT
ANY TIME
Premier is unwavering in its claim that a commission was earned for a sale, but has
not at any time put forth a claim for damages. R. at 1-3. Mr. Sieg may be liable in
damages for removing his property from the market prior to the expiration of the listing
term; however, Premier has at no time set forth this claim or presented any damages. Mr.
Sieg puts forth this argument merely to shed light on the fact that Premier may have a
remedy, but not the remedy it seeks. In other words, there is no hardship on Premier for
Mr. Sieg's removal of the property prior to the term of the listing, because had they been
damaged by the transfer they could have sought recovery of such damages from Mr. Sieg.
This proposition and theory of damages is well understood and set forth clearly in Lewis
v. Dahl cited supra. Justice Turner again sets forth the proper rationale,
[pjlaintiff [broker] is entitled to a sales commission if he
produced a buyer ready, willing and able to buy according to
the terms of the listing agreement. Plaintiff is entitled to a
commission if during the life of the contract, the property was
sold by the owner, and plaintiff is entitled to damages for
breach of contract if during the life of the contract, it was
breached by the owner so that the broker was prevented from
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earning a commission. In other words, if the owner created a
condition which prevented or prohibited plaintiff from
performing the contract, then the owner is liable in damages.
Lewis v. Dahl. 161 P.2d at 367 (emphasis added).
Thus, the law provides Premier a remedy against Mr. Sieg should they be able to
show damages for his removal of the property from the market prior to the expiration of
the listing agreement. However, Premier fails to state this claim in its complaint, and fails
to show any damages, and if this Court agrees that Premier has failed to show that a
commission was properly earned on a sale, the result in the lower Court should be affirmed.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED MR.
SIEG HIS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AS THE
PREVAILING PARTY AND THE AMOUNT AWARDED
WAS REASONABLE AND THE COURT WAS IN
CONTROL OF ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO MAKE THIS
DISCRETIONARY AWARD
Attorney fees and costs are awarded as a matter of right when a contract so provides.
Cabrera v. Cotrell 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). It is not disputed that the prevailing
party shall be awarded its attorney fees under the listing agreement. As Premier's brief sets
forth, the listing agreement provides,
[i]n case of the employment of an attorney in any matter
arising out of this listing agreement (including a sale of the
property) the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from
the other party all costs and reasonable attorney fees, whether
the matter is resolved through court action or otherwise.
R. at 110, Tf 8. Thus, as the prevailing party below, the trial court was correct in awarding
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Mr. Sieg his attorney fee and costs, and that award should be affirmed by this court.
While apparently conceding the above, Premier argues that Mr. Sieg failed to
present enough evidence on attorney fees for the court to make a properly informed,
reasonable award. See Appellant Brief, pgs. 29-30. However, it is Mr. Sieg's position that
the court was well enough informed to determine that the fees awarded were reasonable.
The standard of review on the appeal of the amount of a trial court's award of fees is
"patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,316 (Utah
1998) (citations omitted). Further, the reason this determination is in the sound discretion
of the trial court is because of its familiarity with litigation, attorneys, and attorney fees in
general. Paffel v. Paffel 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
For purposes of this argument, Mr. Sieg concedes that he did not strictly comply
with the provisions of Rule 4-505(1) Utah Code of Judicial Administration in his affidavit.
However, he argues that his affidavit, coupled with the court's file, the court's
understanding of when the attorney fees began to be incurred, the complexity of the
litigation, the burdensome nature of the filings, and the insights accorded at oral argument,
provided the court with the necessary evidence to assess the reasonableness of the award.6
While setting forth that the requesting party has the burden of preventing evidence to
support an award of attorney fees, the Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266 (Utah

6

The trial court also had Premier's affidavit of fees, which complied strictly with
the dictates of Rule 4-505(1) UCJA, and time sheets, clearly setting forth the nature of the
work performed. R. at 223-89. Presumably, the Court should be able to use all evidence
before it to form its discretionary conclusions, not just the evidence prepared by Mr. Sieg.
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1992) court stated,
[e]xcept in the most simple cases, the evidence should include
the hours spent on the case, the hourly rate or rates charged for
those hours, and usual and customary rates for such work. The
evidence may be supplied by affidavit.
Id., 830 P.2d at 268. Mr Sieg feels his affidavit sets forth just such criteria in compliance
with Cottonwood Mall. Further, Premier's argument is that without such evidence as
indicated by Rule 4-505(1), the court cannot assess the reasonableness of the attorney fee
request. However, Mr. Sieg believes that Premier underestimates the court's capacity. In
Cabrera v. Cotrell 649 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) cited by Premier, the Utah Supreme Court
sets out several factors which the court may consider in determining reasonableness.
The difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys
in presenting the case, the reasonableness of hours spent on the
case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the case and the result
attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved.
Id., 694 P.2d at 625. Mr. Sieg feels that the trial court is in the peculiarly best position to
assess these factors, and was in control of enough information to make these
determinations.
This proposition is bolstered by Justices Russon, Howe, Stewart, and Zimmerman
in concurrence, in the Supreme Court's prevailing opinion that the trial court was within
its discretion in its award of attorney fees. Through Russon, the court states,
[a]ll factors, including those listed [in Cabrera] above, must be
given careful consideration in the determination of the
necessity and reasonableness of attorney fees. Trial judges are
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uniquely equipped to make such determinations and have
traditionally been given broad discretion. They are routinely
required to determine an award of reasonable attorney fees in
numerous cases on the basis of evidence presented in the form
of stipulations, proffers, or testimony. They are in the best
position to evaluate fees customarily charged in the locality for
similar services, the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved, reasonableness of the hours, and numerous other
factors. For this reason, this court has consistently held that the
determination of reasonable attorney fees is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge and will not be overturned in the
absence of clear abuse of discretion.
Salmon v. Davis County. 289 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 8-9 (Utah 1996).
The record shows that the trial court in this matter was in command of many factors,
including: when the legal work began (approximately December, 1998); the substance of
the legal work prior to the filing of the complaint; the substance of the legal work after the
filing of the complaint; the complexity of the litigation; the effectiveness of counsel; and
the result attained. See R.; R. at 223-29; R. at 337-39. In other words, the trial court, under
the totality of the evidence before it, had enough information upon which to base a
reasonable award for attorney fees.
Therefore, since the award of attorney fees was properly made as per contract, and
since the trial court had enough information upon which to assess the reasonableness of the
attorney fees awarded, the award of attorney fees should be affirmed. At a minimum, this
court should affirm the award of attorney fees and remand for a more thorough
determination of a reasonable amount of attorney fees. See Foote v. Clark. 347 Utah Adv.
Rep. 36,40 (Utah 1998)(wherein the court affirmed the award of attorney fees but reversed
on the amount of that award and remanded for a proper determination of the amount).
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VII
SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR MR. SIEG BE
AFFIRMED FOR ANY REASON, MR. SIEG SHOULD
BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
As set forth above, attorney fees are provided by contract to the prevailing party and
this case should be remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of determining the
amount of the fees and costs necessary for defending this appeal. See Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S.
Energy Corp.. 993 P.2d 222 (Utah App. Ct. 1999); and Management Servs. Corp. v.
Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980).
Since the contractual provision in Premier's listing agreement providing for the
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party is not limited in any way, the prevailing party
on this appeal should be awarded attorney fees and costs of this appeal and it should be
remanded to the trial court to determine the reasonable amount for this award.
CONCLUSION
The district court's October 6, 2000 Order, as supplemented by its December 7,
2000 Minute Entry should be affirmed. This court should remand the case to the district
court with instructions to determine reasonable fees and costs awardable to Mr. Sieg for
purposes of defending this appeal.
DATED this (f

day of October, 2001.
LIAPIS & GRAY, L.C.

jorop. GHAY/
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellee Thomas K. Sieg
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MJTM, LLC
OPERATING AGREEMENT
This MJTM, LLC Operating Agreement (the "Agreement") is made and entered by
and among the Original Members of the Company, as such term is defined in Section 2.1.W,
and such other persons who make the capital contributions provided and are admitted as
Additional Members pursuant to 4.2 below.
RECITALS
A.
The Members have formed a Utah limited liability company (the "Company")
in accordance with the Act, for the purposes and on the terms, covenants and conditions set
forth herein.
B.
Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, the Members have caused to
be executed the Articles of Organization for the Company and will cause the same to be filed
with the Division.
C.
The Members have each reviewed this Agreement, in its entirety, and desire to
cause the same to be adopted as and for the operating agreement of the Company, in
accordance with the Act.

AGREEMENT
Pursuant to the Act, and all other pertinent laws of the State of Utah and its political
subdivisions, and in exchange for good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency and
receipt of which are hereby acknowledged, the undersigned Members and Managers mutually
agree and covenant as follows:
ARTICLE 1. ORGANIZATION
1.1
Creation. The Members hereby form a Utah limited liability company
pursuant to the provisions of the Act.
1.2
Name The business of the Company shall be conducted under the name
MJTM, LLC.
1.3
Principal Place of Business. The principal place of business for the Company
shall be 273 East Capitol Street. Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 unless changed by the
Managers by giving written notice to all the Members of any change in location not less than
ten (10) days preceding such change.

1.4
Commencement of Business. The Company shall commence as of the date of
filing of the Company's Articles of Organization with the Division and shall continue
thereafter until December 31, 2027, or until sooner terminated as provided herein. The
Company may not transact any business nor incur any indebtedness, excepting that which is
incidental to its organization or to obtaining subscriptions for or payment of contributions to
the capital of the Company, until the Articles of Organization of the Company have been
filed with the Division. For purposes of this Section 1.4, the Articles of Organization of the
Company shall be deemed filed with the Division when the Division places its stamp or seal
on the original Articles of Organization and the original Articles of Organization are filed in
the office of the Division.

ARTICLE 2. DEFINITIONS
2.1
meanings:

Definitions. The terms used in this Agreement shall have the following

A.
Act means the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, Title 48,
Chapter 2b, Utah Code Annotated.
B.
Additional Capital Contributions means contributions of cash or other
properties to the Company, in addition to the Members' Initial Capital Contributions as set
forth on Exhibit A attached hereto.
C.
Additional Members means those persons who have agreed to become
Members in addition to the Original Members, have agreed to be bound by the terms of this
Agreement as Additional Members, and have made the capital contribution required pursuant
to Section 4.2 hereof.
D.
Adjusted Capital Account Deficit means, with respect to any Member,
the deficit balance, if any, in such Member's Capital Account as of the end of the relevant
Fiscal Year, after giving effect to the following adjustments:
(1)
Credit to such Capital Account any amounts which such
Member is obligated to restore pursuant to any provision of this Agreement or
is deemed to be obligated to restore pursuant to the penultimate sentences of
Regulations Sections 1.704-2(g)(l) and 1.704-2(0(5); and
(2)
Debit to such Capital Account the items described in Sections
1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(5), and 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(6) of
the Regulations.

The foregoing definition of Adjusted Capital Account Deficit is intended to comply
with the provisions of Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d) of the Regulations and shall be
interpreted consistently therewith.
E.
Capital Account means, with respect to any Member, the Capital
Account maintained for such Person in accordance with the following provisions:
(1)
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Member's Capital Contributions, <nich Mepiftcr's distributive share of Profits
and anyltems in the nature of income or gain which are specially allocated
pursuant to Section 7.3 or Section 7.4 hereof, and the amount of any Company
liabilities assumed by sy»h Mfm-W n r TT'hiph nr*^™Tr»r1 by any Property
distributed to such Member.
(2)
To each Member's Capital Account there shall be debited the
amount_o£cas!u*r>rl r h e <^ross Asset Value of any Property distributed to such
Member pursuant to any provision of this Agreement;, such-Member's
distributive share of Losses and any items in the nature of expenses or losses
*wKjch are specially allocated^ pursuant to Section~7.3 or Section 7.4 h e r e o f
ana the amount of any liabilities of such Member assumed by the^Company^or^
which are secured bv anylbropeny contriputea pysuch Membertothe
Company/
(3)
In the event any interest in the Company is transferred in
accordance with the terms of this Agreement, the transferee shall succeed to
the Capital Account of the transferor to the extent it relates to the transferred
interest.
(4)
In determining the amount of any liability for purposes of
Sections 2.1.E.(1) and 2.1.E.(2) hereof, there shall be taken into account Code
Section 752(c) and any other applicable provisions of the Code and
Regulations.
The foregoing provisions and the other provisions of this Agreement relating
to the maintenance of Capital Accounts are intended to comply with Regulations
Section 1.704-l(b), and shall be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with
such Regulations. In the event the Members shall determine that it is prudent to
modify the manner in which the Capital Accounts, or any debits or credits thereto
(including, without limitation, debits or credits relating to liabilities which are secured
by contributed or distributed property or which are assumed by the Company or the
Members), are computed in order to comply with such Regulations, the Members
may make such modification, provided that is not likely to have a material effect on
the amounts distributable to any Member pursuant to Section 13.3 hereof upon the

dissolution of the Company. The Members also shall (i) make any adjustments that
are necessary or appropriate to maintain equality between the Capital Accounts of the
Members and the amount of Company capital reflected on the Company's balance
sheet, as computed for book purposes in accordance with Regulations Section
1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(g), and (ii) make any appropriate modifications in the event
unanticipated events (for example, the acquisition by the Company of oil or gas
properties) might otherwise cause this Agreement not to comply with Regulations
Section 1.704-l(b).
F.
Capital Contributions means^jvuh respect to anyii^embeiiJt^^
of money and the initial Gross Asset Value of any property TotKsflhan money l_contributed to
-^^ttig-Cunipaiiy VTigrfeSpeertolhe interest in the Company held by such Member pursuant to
'Sejerms of this Agreement. The principal amount of a promissory note which is not readily
traded on an established securities market and which is contributed to the Company by the
maker of the note (or by a Person related to the maker of the note within the meaning of
Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(c)) shall not be included in the Capital Contribution of
any Member until the Company makes a taxable disposition of the note or until (and to the
extent) principal payments are made on the note, all in accordance with Regulations Section
1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2).
G.

Code means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

H.

Company means MJTM, LLC, a Utah limited liability company.

I.
Depreciation means, for each Fiscal Year, an amount equal to the
depreciation, amortization, or other cost recovery deduction allowable with respect to an
asset for such Fiscal Year, except that if the Gross Asset Value of an asset differs from its
adjusted basis for federal income tax purposes at the beginning of such Fiscal Year,
Depreciation shall be an amount which bears the same ratio to such beginning Gross Asset
Value as the federal income tax depreciation, amortization, or other cost recovery deduction
for such Fiscal Year bears to such beginning adjusted tax basis; provided, however, that if
the adjusted basis for federal income tax purposes of an asset at the beginning of such Fiscal
Year is zero, Depreciation shall be determined with reference to such beginning Gross Asset
Value using any reasonable method determined by the Members.
J.
Division means the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code of
the Department of Commerce, State of Utah.
K.
Final Percentage Interest means the Final Percentage Interest in the
Company of each Member as determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 4
below.
L.
Gross Asset Value means, with respect to any asset, the asset's adjusted
basis for federal income tax purposes, except as follows:

(1)
The initial Gross Asset Value of any asset contributed by a
Member to the Company shall be the gross fair market value of such asset, as
determined by the Members;
(2)
The Gross Asset Values of all Company assets shall be adjusted,
as determined by the Members, to equal their respective gross fair market
values (taking into account Section 7701(g) of the Code) as of the following
times: (A) jfaejicquisition of an additional interest in the Company by any new
orjristingJMtembci in exchangc-fefr-fflorf* than a de-minimis^Capital
contribution; (B) thejiisinhiito
a
de minimis amount of Property as consideration for an interestin the
Company; and (C) the liquidation of the Company within the meamng of
Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(g); provided, however, that adjustments
pursuant to clauses (A) and (B) above shall be made only if the Members
determine that such adjustments are necessary or appropriate to reflect the
relative economic interests of the Members in the Company;
(3)
The Gross Asset Value of any Company asset distributed to any
Member shall be adjusted to equal the gross fair market value of such asset on
the date of distribution as determined by the Members; and
(4)
The Gross Asset Values of Company assets shall be increased
(or decreased) to reflect any adjustments to the adjusted basis of such assets
pursuant to Code Section 734(b) or Code Section 743(b), but only to the extent
that such adjustments are taken into account in determining Capital Accounts
pursuant to Regulations Section 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv)(m) and Sections 2.1.AD.(6)
and 7.3.G hereof; provided, however, that Gross Asset Values shall not be
adjusted pursuant to this Section 2.1.L.(4) to the extent that the Members
determine that an adjustment pursuant to Section 2.1.L.(2) hereof is necessary
or appropriate in connection with a transaction that would otherwise result in
an adjustment pursuant to this Section 2.1.L.(4).
If the Gross Asset VaJue of an asset has been determined or adjusted pursuant to
Section 2.1.L.Q), Section 2.1.L.(2), or Section 2.1.L.(4) hereof, such Gross Asset
Value shall thereafter be adjusted by the Depreciation taken into account with respect
to such asset for purposes of computing Profits and Losses.
M.
Initial CapitaPCo^ribuHnnc; m^n^ r ^ r j n j r ; n | contribution of_cash or
other properties to the^Compahv bv the Members as set forth on the, attached Exh]bITA7~
N.
Initial Capital Contribution of Tom_Sieg means the initial contribution
of cash orjjther prope'rties to tne Company by~the Tom Sieg as set forth on thTattached
Exhibit A"
"
"
~

0.
Initial Allocation Percentage means the Initial Allocation Percentage of
such member as determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, below.
P.
Initial Percentage Interest means the Initial Percentage Interest in the
Company of each MembeFas determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 ~
*t>6ioiEC "
"
"
~"
"
"~
Q.
Interest or Member's Interest meansjuun^iVfti?! Jt/femfapj's share of
thgCompany^assets. profits^ surplusjy losses, and all rightsof a Member of a limited
JiaCTity-comf^v under the Act and under this Agreement.
R.
Section 9.1 below.

Managers means the managers of the Company as set forth in

S.
Member or Members means the Original Members and the Additional
Members admitted in accordance with this Agreement, but shall not mean the husband, wife,
child or parent of any Member unless such husband, wife, child or parent is expressly named
herein as a Member.
T.
Net profits or losses means the net profits or losses of the Company for
federal income tax purposes as determined by the accountants employed by the Company;
provided, however, that in the event the profits or losses ot the Company are later adjusted
in any manner, as the result of an audit by the Internal Revenue Service, or otherwise, then
the net profits or losses of the Company shall be adjusted to the same extent.
U.
Nonrecourse Deductions has the meaning set forth in Section
1.704-2(b)(l) of the Regulations.
V.
Nonrecourse Liability has the meaning set forth in Section
1.704-2(b)(3) of the Regulations.
W.
Original Members means the original Members of the Company as set
forth in Section 4.1 below.
X.
Partner Nonrecourse Debt has the meaning set forth in Section
1.704-2(b)(4) of the Regulations, references to "Partner" therein being deemed to refer to the
Members.
Y.
Partner Nonrecourse Debt Minimum Gain means an amount, with
respect to each Partner Nonrecourse Debt, equal to the Partnership Minimum Gain that
would result if such Partner Nonrecourse Debt were treated as a Nonrecourse Liability,
determined in accordance with Section 1.704-2(i)(3) of the Regulations, with references
therein to "Partner" being deemed to refer to the Members and to "Partnership" being
deemed to refer to the Company.

Z.
Partner Nonrecourse Deductions has the meaning set forth in Sections
1.7Q4-2(i)(l) and 1.704-2(i)(2), with references therein to "Partner" being deemed to refer to
the Members.
AA. Partnership Minimum Gain has the meaning set forth in Regulations
Section 1.704-2(b)(2) and 1.704-2(d), with references therein to "Partnership" being deemed
to refer to the Company.
AB. Percentage-Interest meafis-«^ljefeKJa^enefically the Imtial
Percentagejnterest and Final Percentage Intgrestjnjhe^
AC. Priority Return means a sum equal to nine percent (9%) per annum.
^determined on the basis of a year of 36i nr 366-davjw. as the case mav-her for the acmal
number of dajs occurring in tbg period for which the Priority Rfttym *s bHng dptprpiinerl,
cumulative (but not compounded)jo thp pYteqt nor riktnh!it^d_piir^ianf to S^tion 8 1 A
hereof, of the Initial Capital Contribution^ .Tom Sieg, commencing on the date of formation
of the Companyand ending on the date Tom Sieg has received total distributions piixma^j^r
Section O . B equal to tfieamount of the Initial Capital Contribution of Tom Sieg.
AD. Profits and Losses means, for each Fiscal Year, an amount equal to the
Company's taxable income or loss for such Fiscal Year, determined in accordance with Code
Section 703(a) (for this purposes, all items of income, gain, loss, or deduction required to be
stated separately pursuant to Code Section 703(a)(1) shall be included in taxable income or
loss), with the following adjustments:
(1)
Any income of the Company that is exempt from federal income
tax and not otherwise taken into account in computing Profits or Losses
pursuant to this Section 2. LAD shall be added to such taxable income or loss;
(2)
Any expenditures of the Company described in Code Section
705(a)(2)(B) or treated as Code Section 705(a)(2)(B) expenditures pursuant to
Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(i), and not otherwise taken into account
in computing Profits or Losses pursuant to this Section 2. LAD shall be
subtracted from such taxable income or loss;
(3)
In the event the Gross Asset Value of any Company asset is
adjusted pursuant to Section 2.1.L.(2) or Section 2.1.L.(3) hereof, the amount
of such adjustment shall be taken into account as gain or loss from the
disposition of such asset for purposes of computing Profits or Losses;
(4)
Gain or loss resulting from any disposition of Property with
respect to which gain or loss is recognized for federal income tax purposes
shall be computed by reference to the Gross Asset Value of the Property

disposed of, notwithstanding that the adjusted tax basis of such Property differs
from its Gross Asset Value;
(5)
In lieu of the depreciation, amortization, and other cost recovery
deductions taken into account in computing such taxable income or loss, there
shall be taken into account Depreciation for such Fiscal Year, computed in
accordance with Section 2.1.1 hereof;
(6)
To the extent an adjustment to the adjusted tax basis of any
Company asset pursuant to Code Section 734(b) or Code Section 743(b) is
required pursuant to Regulations Section 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv)(m)(4) to be taken
into account in determining Capital Accounts as a result of a distribution other
than in liquidation of a Member's interest in the Company, the amount of such
adjustment shall be treated as an item of gain (if the adjustment increases the
basis of the asset) or loss (if the adjustment decreases the basis of the asset)
from the disposition of the asset and shall be taken into account for purposes
of computing Profits or Losses; and
(7)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section 2. LAD, any
items which are specially allocated pursuant to Sections 7.3, 7.4 and 7.6
hereof shall not be taken into account in computing Profits or Losses.
The amounts of the items of Company income, gain, loss or deduction available to be
specially allocated pursuant to Sections 7.3 and 7.4 hereof shall be determined by
applying rules analogous to those set forth in Sections 2.1.AD.(1) through 2.LAD.(6)
above.
AE. Substitute Member means a person who acquires an Interest in the
Company from a Member pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Upon the
satisfaction of all terms and conditions to the acquisition of a Member's Interest, specifically
including, but without limitation, all conditions set forth in Sections 11.9 and 11.10 below,
the person acquiring such Interest will become a Member.
AF. Regulations means the Income Tax Regulations, including Temporary
Regulations, promulgated under the Code, as such regulations may be amended from time to
time (including corresponding provisions of succeeding regulations).
AG.

Regulatory Allocations has the meaning set forth in Section 7.4 hereof.

ARTICLE 3. PURPOSES
3.1
Purposes. ThgjprinHpql purpose of the Company sh?11 b* ** mgag e ir* the
renovation and operation of a first rate bed and breakfast luxury inn^ancLfertheF-to-transact
j h y and all lawful business for which limited liability companies may be organized underJhe
Act including but not l i m ^ j o j ^ a d e j } ! ^ lease, improve, develop and sel^real estate,
personal property, mmerals, oil and gas and allied enterprises and all attendant rights therein;
to invest in stocks, bonds and any and all other securities, and to participate in buying,
selling and trading of the same; to invest in various business ventures and the purchasing and
holding of the equity interests therein; to loan, borrow or raise monies for any of the
purposes of the Company; to manage business, trust and investment assets owned by the
Company; to consolidate fractional interests in Member assets; to increase the wealth of the
Members and to engage in any other lawful business.

ARTICLE 4. MEMBERS OF THE COMPANY
4.1
Members. The names, addresses, Initial Percentage Interests and Final
Percentage Interests of the Original Members of the Company as of the date of this
Agreement are as follows:
INITIAL
PERCENTAGE
INTEREST

HNAfc
PERCENTAGE
INTEREST

NAME

ADDRESS

Tom Sieg

239 East Capitol Boulevard
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

40%

25.7732%

Marion C. Vaughn

168 North 100 East
Logan, Utah 84321

20%

24.7423%

Jane Johnson

57 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

20%

24.7423%

Michael G. Davis

273 East Capitol Boulevard
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

20%

24.7423%

The Initial Allocation Percentages are as follows:
NAME

INITIAL ALLOCATION
PERCENTAGES

Tom Sieg

10.0%

Marion C. Vaughn

30.0%

Jane Johnson

30.0%

Michael G. Davis

30.0%

4.2
Additional Members. There shall be admitted to the Company such additional
Members with such Initial Percentage Interests and Final Percentage Interests and on such
terms and with such contributions to the capital of the Company as the Managers may from
time to time determine, with the approval of Members owning Interests representing more
than ninety-one percent (91%) of the Initial Percentage Interests represented by the then
outstanding Interests owned by the then Members. Such persons shall agree to become
bound by this Agreement as Additional Members, and by accepting an Interest in the
Company and making a contribution to the capital of the Company such persons shall be
deemed to so agree and become bound.
4.3
Classes of Members. There shall be one class of Members. There shall be no
distinction between the rights and liabilities of Members, other than as represented by
distinctions in Initial Percentage Interests, Final Percentage Interests and Capital Accounts.
4.4
Adjustment of Percentage Interests. The Initial Percentage Interests and Final
Percentage Interests of the Members shall be subject to proportionate adjustment upon the
admission of Additional Members pursuant to Section 4.2 hereof to accommodate the Initial
Percentage Interests and Final Percentage Interests of the Additional Members, the total of
all Initial Percentage Interests outstanding at any given time to be 100% and the total of all
Final Percentage Interests outstanding at any given time to be 100%.

ARTICLE 5. LIABILITY OF MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
Neither the Members, the Managers nor the Employees of the Company are
personally liable under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a
debt, obligation, or liability of the Company.

ARTICLE 6. CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS; LOANS
6.1

Initial Capital Contributions. The property and assets identified on the

attached Exhibit A^which is jpr.nrporatedficrcin4w"tFri<rrpfrrpnri^ shaJLcoogtmit^^

Capital Contribution of the Members to the Company.
6.2
Additional Capital Contributions. From time to time, upon written consent of
the Managers, each of the Members may contribute additional cash and other properties into
the Company which shall constitute Additional Capital Contributions. Any transfer of cash
or other property made by a Member to the Company shall be deemed to be a capital

_

contribution credited to that Member's Capital Account, unless the transferor Member
otherwise specifies at the time the transfer is made. Unless specifically designated otherwise,
if the transferor Member designates that the contribution is to be allocated to the Capital
Account of one or more other Members, it shall be deemed to be a capital contribution to the
transferor Member's Capital Account followed by a gift of Company Interests to the other
Member(s). Any gift made to the Company by a person other than a Member shall be
considered to be a gift to the Members and thereafter a capital contribution by the Members
to their respective Capital Accounts in the same ratio as their then existing Capital Accounts
in the Company, unless the donor otherwise specifies a different ratio at the time the gift is
made.
The Managers may accept or reject any contribution or gift to the Company if the
Managers believe it is in the best interests of the Company not to accept the gift or
contribution.
6.3
Withdrawal of Capital Contributions. Except as otherwise expressly provided
inJ^s_Agieeinent, only upon the winding, up of the-agakg-of the^Qompany and dissolution
of-theJiusiness of the Company by the salvor other_disposition of the Company's ass^tsZanrP.
^ie collection of all proceedsTfiefeirom, may any of the Capital Contributions be withdrawn.
Ko^Megflwlfl^
Contributions orjisjQjrofirs, losses, or distributions. No Member shall be personally liable
to anylotheiv^mhrr for-the rrmrn of.any^art-^f-the44embei^l^^i^Contributions.
»£apital Contributions shalljiotJbeaiJnffarp..st ^
6.4
Loans. Any Member may, with the consent of the Managers, make loans to
the Company. The amount of any such loan or advance shall not increase the Capital
Account of the lending Member nor entitle such lending Member to any increase in the
Member's share of distributions of the Company or subject the Member to any greater
portion of the losses which the Company may sustain. The amount of any such loan or
advance shall be a debt due from the Company to such lending Member and shall be
repayable on such terms and conditions, and bear interest at such rate as shall be mutually
agreed upon between the lending Member and the Company. The loan may be secured, if
required by the lending Member and consented to by the Managers, by a mortgage on any or
all of the properties of the Company. Such loans shall be repaid, together with interest,
prior to the time any distributions are made to the Members.

ARTICLE 7. CAPITAL ACCOUNTS; ALLOCATIONS OF
PROFITS AND LOSSES; CASH DISTRIBUTIONS
7.1
Profits. After giving effect to the special allocations set forth in Sections 7.3,
7.4 and 7.6 hereof, Profits for any Fiscal Year shall be allocated among the Members in the
following manner and order of priority:

A.
To each Member in an amount equal to the excess, if any, of (i) the
sum of the cumulative Losses allocated to the Member pursuant to Section 7.2 hereof
for all prior Fiscal Years, over (ii) the cumulative Profits allocated to such Member
pursuant to this Section 7. LA for all prior Fiscal Years, in the same proportion which
the amount of such excess calculated for the Member bears to the total amount of
such excess calculated for all Members;
B.
To Tom Sieg in an amount equal to the excess, if any, of (i) the
cumulative distributions Tom Sieg has received pursuant to Section 8.LA hereof from
the commencement of the Company to the Annual Cutoff Date following the most
recently completed Fiscal Year, over (ii) the cumulative Profits allocated to Tom Sieg
pursuant to this Section 7.LB for all prior Fiscal Years, in the same proportion which
the amount of such excess calculated for the Member bears to the total amount of
such excess calculated for all Members;
C.
To the Members in proportion to their Initial Allocation Percentages for
all Fiscal Years in which Tom Sieg receives distributions pursuant to Section 8. LB,
but such allocations shall be made only to the extent that the ratio of the Capital
Account of Tom Sieg to the Capital Account of any of the other Members is less than
the ratio of the Final Percentage Interest of Tom Sieg to the Final Percentage Interest
of said Member, after giving effect to all distributions, contributions and allocation of
Profits and Losses for the current and all prior Fiscal Years, and other-feaa
allocations pursuant to Sections 7.1.D and 7.1.E, pursuant to this Section 7.1.C for
the current and for all prior Fiscal Years;
D.
To each Member in an amount equal to the excess, if any, of (i) the
sum of the cumulative distributions to the Member pursuant to Section 8.LC hereof
for the current and all prior Fiscal Years, over (ii) the cumulative Profits allocated to
such Member pursuant to this Section 7.1.D for all prior Fiscal Years, in the same
proportion which the amount of such excess calculated for the Member bears to the
total amount of such excess calculated for all Members;
E.
The balance, if any, to the Members in accordance with their Final
Percentage Interests.
7.2
Losses. After giving effect to the special allocations set forth in Sections 7.3,
7.4 and 7.6 hereof, Losses for any Fiscal Year shall be allocated as in the following order
and priority, subject to the limitation in Section 7.2.C below:
A.
To each Member in an amount equal to the excess, if any, of (i) the
cumulative Profits allocated pursuant to Section 7.1 hereof for the current and all
prior Fiscal Years, over (ii) the cumulative Losses allocated pursuant to this Section
7.2.A for ail prior Fiscal Years, in the same proportion which the amount of such

excess calculated for the Member bears to the total amount of such excess calculated
for all Members;
B.
The balance, if any, to the Members in accordance with their Final
Percentage Interests.
C.
The Losses allocated to any Member pursuant to Sections 7.2.A
through 7.2.B hereof shall not exceed the maximum amount of Losses that can be so
allocated without causing any Member to have an Adjusted Capital Account Deficit at
the end of any Fiscal Year. In the event some but not all of the Members would have
Adjusted Capital Account Deficits as a consequence of an allocation of Losses
pursuant to Sections 7.2.A through 7.2.B hereof, the limitation set forth in this
Section 7.2.C shall be applied on a Member by Member basis so as to allocate the
maximum permissible Losses to each Member under Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d) of
the Regulations. All Losses in excess of the limitations set forth in this Section 7.2.C
shall be allocated among the Members in accordance with Section 7.2.B.
7.3
Special Allocations. The following special allocations shall be made in the
following order:
A.
Minimum Gain Chargeback. Except as otherwise provided in Section
1.704-2(f) of the Regulations, notwithstanding any other provision of this Article 7, if
there is a net decrease in Partnership Minimum Gain during any Company Fiscal
Year, each Member shall be specially allocated items of Company income and gain
for such Fiscal Year (and, if necessary, subsequent Fiscal Years) in an amount equal
to such Member's share of the net decrease in Partnership Minimum Gain,
determined in accordance with Regulations Section 1.704-2(g). Allocations pursuant
to the previous sentence shall be made in proportion to the respective amounts
required to be allocated to each Member pursuant thereto. The items to be so
allocated shall be determined in accordance with Sections 1.704-2(f)(6) and
1.704-2(j)(2) of the Regulations. This Section 7.3.A is intended to comply with the
minimum gain chargeback requirement in Section 1.704-2(f) of the Regulations and
shall be interpreted consistently therewith.
B.
Partner Minimum Gain Chargeback. Except as otherwise provided in
Section 1.704-1(0(4) of the Regulations, notwithstanding any other provision of this
Article 7, if there is a net decrease in Partner Nonrecourse Debt Minimum Gain
attributable to a Partner Nonrecourse Debt during any Company Fiscal Year, each
Member who has a share of the Partner Nonrecourse Debt Minimum Gain attributable
to such Partner Nonrecourse Debt, determined in accordance with Section
1.704-2(0(5) of the Regulations, shall be specially allocated items of Company
income and gain for such Fiscal Year (and, if necessary, subsequent Fiscal Years) in
an amount equal to such Member's share of the net decrease in Partner Nonrecourse
Debt Minimum Gain attributable to such Partner Nonrecourse Debt, determined in

accordance with Regulations Section 1.704-2(0(4). Allocations pursuant to the
previous sentence shall be made in proportion to the respective amounts required to
be allocated to each Member pursuant thereto. The items to be so allocated shall be
determined in accordance with Sections 1.704-2(i)(4) and 1.704-2(j)(2) of the
Regulations. This Section 7.3.B is intended to comply with the minimum gain
chargeback requirement in Section 1.704-2(i)(4) of the Regulations and shall be
interpreted consistently therewith.
C.
Qualified Income Offset. In the event any Member unexpectedly
receives any adjustments, allocations, or distributions described in Sections
1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(5), or 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(6) of the
Regulations, items of Company income and gain shall be specially allocated to each
such Member in an amount and manner sufficient to eliminate, to the extent required
by the Regulations, the Adjusted Capital Account Deficit of such Member as quickly
as possible, provided that an allocation pursuant to this Section 7.3.C shall be made
only if and to the extent that such Member would have an Adjusted Capital Account
Deficit after all other allocations provided for in this Section 3 have been tentatively
made as if this Section 7.3.C were not in the Agreement.
D.
Gross Income Allocation. In the event any Member has a deficit
Capital Account at the end of any Fiscal Year which is in excess of the sum of (i) the
amount such Member is obligated to restore pursuant to any provision of this
Agreement, and (ii) the amount such Member is deemed to be obligated to restore
pursuant to the penultimate sentences of Sections 1.7Q4-2(g)(l) and 1.704-2(0(5) of
the Regulations, each such Member shall be specially allocated items of. Company
income and gain in the amount of such excess as quickly as possible, provided that an
allocation pursuant to this Section 7.3.D shall be made only if and to the extent that
such Member would have a deficit Capital Account in excess of such sum after all
other allocations provided for in this Article 7 have been made as if Section 7.3.C
hereof and this Section 7.3.D were not in the Agreement.
E.
Nonrecourse Deductions. Nonrecourse Deductions for any Fiscal Year
shall be specially allocated among the Members in the same proportion as would be
made an allocation of such amount of Loss pursuant to Section 7.2.
F.
Partner Nonrecourse Deductions. Any Partner Nonrecourse Deductions
for any Fiscal Year shall be specially allocated to the Member who bears the
economic risk of loss with respect to the Partner Nonrecourse Debt to which such
Partner Nonrecourse Deductions are attributable in accordance with Regulations
Section 1.704-2(i)(l).
G.
Code Section 754 Adjustment. To the extent an adjustment to the
adjusted tax basis of any Company asset pursuant to Code Section 734(b) or Code
Section 743(b) is required, pursuant to Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m)(2) or

Regulations Section 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iv)(m)(4), to be taken into account in determining
Capital Accounts as the result of a distribution to a Member in complete liquidation of
his interest in the Company, the amount of such adjustment to the Capital Accounts
shall be treated as an item of gain (if the adjustment increases the basis of the asset)
or loss (if the adjustment decreases such basis) and such gain or loss shall be specially
allocated to the Members in the same proportion as a like amount of Profits would be
allocated pursuant to Section 7.1.B or 7.1.C, as applicable at the time, in the event
Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m)(2) applies, or to the Members to whom such
distribution was made in the event Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(m)(4)
applies.
H.
Allocations Relating to Taxable Issuance of Company Interests. Any
income, gain, loss or deduction realized as a direct or indirect result of the issuance
of an interest in the Company to a Member (the "Issuance Items") shall be allocated
among the Members so that, to the extent possible, the net amount of such Issuance
Items, together with all other allocations under this Agreement to each Member, shall
be equal to the net amount that would have been allocated to each such Member if the
Issuance Items had not been realized.
7.4
Curative Allocations. The allocations set forth in Sections 7.3.A, 7.3.B,
7.3.C, 7.3.D, 7.3.E, 7.3.F and 7.3.G hereof (the "Regulatory Allocations") are intended to
comply with certain requirements of the Regulations. It is the intent of the Members that, to
the extent possible, all Regulatory Allocations shall oe offset eitner with otner Regulatory
Allocations or with special allocations of other items of Company income, gain, loss, or
deduction pursuant to this Section 7.4. Therefore, notwithstanding any other provision of
this Article 7 (other than the Regulatory Allocations), the Company shall make such
offsetting special allocations of Company income, gain, loss or deduction so that, after such
offsetting allocations are made, each Member's Capital Account balance is, to the extent
possible, equal to the Capital Account balance such Member would have had if the
Regulatory Allocations were not part of the Agreement and all Company items were allocated
pursuant to Sections 7.1, 7.2.A through 7.2.B, and 7.3.H hereof. In making allocations
pursuant to this Section 7.4, the Company shall take into account future Regulatory
Allocations under Sections 7.3.A and 7.3.B that, although not yet made, are likely to offset
other Regulatory Allocations previously made under Sections 7.3.E and 7.3.F.
7.5

Other Allocation Rules.

A.
The Members are aware of the income tax consequences of the
allocations made by this Article 7 and hereby agree to be bound by the provisions of
this Article 7 in reporting their shares of Company income and loss for income tax
purposes.
B.
For purposes of determining the Profits, Losses, or any other items
allocable to any period, Profits, Losses, and any such other items shall be determined

on a daily, monthly, or other basis, as determined by the Company using any
permissible method under Code Section 706 and the Regulations thereunder.
C.
Solely for purposes of determining a Member's proportionate share of
the "excess nonrecourse liabilities" of the Company, within the meaning of
Regulations Section 1.752-3(a)(3), the Members' interests in Company profits are in
proportion to the allocation of Profits pursuant to Section 7.1.B or 7.1.C, as
applicable at the time.
D.
To the extent permitted by Section 1.704-2(h)(3) of the Regulations, the
Company shall endeavor not to treat distributions of Net Cash from Operations, Net
Cash From Sales or Net Cash From Refinancings as having been made from the
proceeds of a Nonrecourse Liability or a Partner Nonrecourse Debt.
E.
The Profits and Losses of the Company and each item of income, gain,
loss, deduction or credit entering into the computation thereof shall be determined on
an annual basis in accordance with the accounting methods followed for Federal
income tax purposes and otherwise in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles and procedures. Each item of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit
entering into the computation of Profits and Losses shall be allocated among the
Members in proportion to the allocation of Profits and Losses among them, except to
the extent a particular item may be otherwise specially allocated under this
Agreement.
7.6
Tax Allocations: Code Section 704(c). In accordance with Code Section
704(c) and the Regulations thereunder, income, gain, loss, and deduction with respect to any
property contributed to the capital of the Company (which includes, without limitation, the
Property) shall, solely for tax purposes, be allocated among the Members so as to take
account of any variation between the adjusted basis of such property to the Company for
federal income tax purposes and its initial Gross Asset Value (computed in accordance with
Section 2.1.L.(1) hereof).
In the event the Gross Asset Value of any Company asset is adjusted pursuant to
Section 2.1.L.(2) hereof, subsequent allocations of income, gain, loss, and deduction with
respect to such asset shall take account of any variation between the adjusted basis of such
asset for federal income tax purposes and its Gross Asset Value in the same manner as under
Code Section 704(c) and the Regulations thereunder.
Any elections or other decisions relating to such allocations shall be made by the
Company in any manner that reasonably reflects the purpose and intention of this Agreement.
Allocations pursuant to this Section 7.6 are solely for purposes of federal, state, and local
taxes and shall not affect, or in any way be taken into account in computing, any Person's
Capital Account or share of Profits, Losses, other items, or distributions pursuant to any
provisions of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 8. DISTRIBUTIONS
8.1
Net Cash. Except as provided in Section 13.3 hereof, Net Cash, if any, shall
be distributed not later than the thirtieth (30th) day after the end of each month in the
following order and priority:
A.
First, to Tom Sieg, an amount equal to the excess, if any, of (i) the
cumulative Priority Return from the inception of the Company to the end of the fiscal
year, over (ii) the sum of all prior distributions to the Members pursuant to this
Section 8.LA;
B.
Second, if any, to the Members, in accordance with their respective
Initial Percentage Interests, until Tom Sieg has received distributions pursuant to this
Section 8.LB equal to the Initial Capital Contribution of Tom Sieg;
C.
The balance, if any, to the Members in accordance with their respective
Final Percentage Interests.
8.2
Minimum Tax Distributions. Except to the extent such distributions would
result in the inability of the Company to continue its operations in accordance with the
Project Development Plan or would result in the foreseeable insolvency of the Company,
additional distributions shall be made on or before March 15 of each Fiscal Year to the
extent that prior distributions under Sections 8.1, this Section 8.2 are in the aggregate less
than the amount of federal and state income taxes incurred by any Member on account of the
allocation to the Member, directly or indirectly, of Profits, income, or gain for all prior
Fiscal Years. The amount of federal and state income taxes incurred by the Members shall
be deemed to be the amount obtained by presuming that all Members incurred tax at the rates
imposed on the Member on whom taxes are imposed at the highest marginal rate of all the
Members. Such distributions shall be made strictly in proportion to the allocation of Profits
to the Members for all such Prior Fiscal Years.
8.3
Reinvestment of Net Cash From Operations and Net Cash From Sales and Net
Cash From Refinancings. The Members may, from time to time, reinvest in the Project all
or any portion of Net Cash From Operations and Net Cash From Sales and Net Cash From
Refinancings.
8.4
Amounts Withheld. All amounts withheld pursuant to the Code or any
provision of any state or local tax law with respect to any payment, distribution or allocation
to the Company or the Members shall be treated as amounts distributed to the Members
pursuant to this Article 8 for all purposes under this Agreement. The Company is authorized
to withhold from distributions, or with respect to allocations, to the Members and to pay
over to any federal, state, or local government any amounts required to be so withheld
pursuant to the Code or any provisions of any other federal, state or local law and shall
allocate such amounts to the Members with respect to which such amount was withheld.

8.5
Distribution in Kind. Distributions of property other than cash shall be
apportioned among the members on the same basis as would be a distribution of Net Cash
From Sales in the amount of the Gross Asset Value of the distributed property as of the date
of distribution, with the same effect on the apportionment of the distribution and all future
distributions of cash or other property as a distribution of cash in such amount.
ARTICLE 9. MANAGEMENT OF THE COMPANY
9.1
Management. The business, operations and properties of the Company shall
be managed by a group of four (4) Managers. The initial Managers shall consist of the
following persons:
Marion Vaughn
Jane Johnson
Tom Sieg
Michael G. Davis
Upon the withdrawal or removal of any of the aboye^ named ManagersJLSUCcessor Manager
ma}TbeTIecEdT)^^
than fifty percent (50%l_nLthe Final Percentage Interests represented hy the then outstanding
Interests ownedby the then Members at a regular or special meeting of the Mgmbers. called
foi^that purpose. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Manager may be^rgauireri ro resign and
a new Managerjor^^lan^g^r^m^y h*» ^rfed by the ^fflnsati^e-^ot^aLthe,Members owning
mofeTKan fiftypercent (50%) ofjhe Final Percentage Interests represented by the then
outstanding InteTests owned by~the then Members. Notwithstandingjhe foregoingJ Tom .Sieg-,
may not oe replaced as a Manager (unless he voluntarily resigns) or be required to resign
from serving as a Manager prior to the date on which all distributions to Tom Sieg described
in Section 8. LB have been made.
9.2
General Powers and Rights of the Managers. The Managers shall be solely
responsible for the management of the Company's business and activities with all rights and
powers generally conferred by law or necessary, advisable or consistent in connection
therewith. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, a majority vote of the Managers
with each Manager getting one vote, shall control. Notwithstanding the foregoing, none of
the following actions shall be approved or occur without the consent of Tom Sieg prior to the
date on which all distributions to Tom Sieg described in Section 8.1.B have been made:
A.

Borrowing any money in excess of $5,000;

B.
Granting any mortgage, trust deed, security interest, lien or any other
encumbrance affecting any real or personal property owned by the Company;

C.
Changes in salaries or compensation of any Manager or granting any
Manager a bonus, management fee or other compensation in addition to his/her initial
salary; and
D.
All Company checks must be signed by at least two Managers, one of
whom shall be Tom Sieg.
9.3
Specific Powers of the Manaeers. In addition to any other rights and powers
which the Managers may possess, and except as limited by Section 9.2 above or by other
relevant sections of this Agreement, the Managers shall have all specific rights and powers
required or appropriate to the management of the Company business, conferred by this
Agreement, by the Act or otherwise, including by way of illustration and not by way of
limitation the following:
A.
To acquire, hold and dispose of any real property, interest therein, or
appurtenance thereto, as well as personal or mixed property connected therewith, including
the purchase, lease development, improvement, maintenance, exchange, trade or sale of such
properties, at such price, rental or amounts, for cash, securities or other property, and upon
such terms, as it deems, in its absolute discretion, to be in the best interest of the Company;
B.
To borrow money and, if security is required therefore, to mortgage or
—14e*^a&y^QitiQi^f4he^r^
other security device, and to prepay, in whole or in part, refinance, increase, modify,
consolidate, or extend any mortgage or other security device, all of the foregoing at such
terms and in such amounts as it deems, in its absolute discretion, to be in the best interests of
the Company;
C.
To place record title to, or the right to use, Company assets in the
name or names of a nominee or nominees for any purpose convenient or beneficial to the
Company;
D.
To acquire and enter into any contract of insurance which the Company
deems necessary and proper for the protection of the Company, for the conservation of its
assets, or for any purpose convenient, or beneficial to the Company;
E.
To employ from time to time persons, firms or corporations for the
operation and management of the Company business, including but not limited to,
supervisory and managing agents, brokers, attorneys, accountants and other professionals, on
such terms and for such compensation as the Managers shall determine;
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F.

To pay any and all organizational expenses incurred in the creation of

the Company;
G.
To compromise, arbitrate, or otherwise adjust claims in favor of or
against the Company and to commence or defend litigation with respect to the Company or
any assets of the Company as the Managers may deem advisable, all or any of the above
matters being at the expense of the Company;
H.
To enter into and execute (a) agreements and any and all documents
and instruments customarily employed in the real estate industry in connection with the
acquisition, sale, lease (whether as lessee or lessor), development, and operation of real
estate properties; (b) agreements, commitments and any and all documents and instruments
customarily employed in real estate financing; and (c) all other instruments deemed by the
Managers to be necessary or appropriate to the proper operation of such real estate properties
and investments or to perform effectively and properly the Managers' duties or exercise the
Managers' powers hereunder;
I.
To borrow money from banks, other lending institutions, and other
lenders for any Company purpose including the maintenance of a margin account with any
securities broker (except as specifically prohibited by this Agreement), and in connection
therewith issue notes debentures and other debt securities and hypothecate the assets of the
Company to secure repayment of borrowed sums; and no bank, other lending institution, or
other lender to which application is made for loan by the Managers shall be required to
inquire as to the purposes for which such loan is sought, and as between this Company and
such bank, other lending institution, or other lender, it shall be conclusively presumed that
the proceeds of such loan are to be and will be used for the purposes authorized under this
Agreement;
J.
To maintain, at the expense of the Company, accurate records and
accounts of all operations and expenditures and furnish the Members with annual statements
of account as of the end of each Company fiscal year, together with tax reporting
information, and quarterly reports on the operations of the Company;
K.
To purchase, at the expense of the Company, liability and other
insurance to protect the Company's properties and business and to protect the Managers,
their agents and employees, and the Members;
L.
To execute instruments, enter into agreements and contracts with
parties, and give receipts, releases and discharges with respect to all of the foregoing matters
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set forth in subsections 9.3.A through 9.3.K above, and any matters incident thereto as the
Managers may deem advisable or appropriate;
M.
To make certain elections under the tax laws of the United States, the
State of Utah, and other relevant jurisdictions as to the treatment of items of Company
income, gain, loss, deduction and credit, and as to all other relevant matters (including
without limitation elections under Section 754 of the Code) as the Managers believe
necessary or desirable.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Managers shall not exercise any of the rights
described in Sections 8.3 A, B or C, without the express written consent of Tom Sieg until
such time as ail distributions to Tom Sieg provided for pursuant to Section 8. LB throughout
the term of the Company have been made.
9.4
Limitations on Managers. In addition to the powers and rights granted in this
Agreement and by statute, the Managers shall have all the rights and powers of a Member of
the Company, except that the Managers have no authority to:
A.

Do any act in contravention of this Agreement;

B.
Do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary
business of the Company;
C.
Confess a judgment against the Company in excess of ten percent
(10%) of the then total assets of the Company, or confess a judgment with respect to a
number of related transactions which aggregate in excess of ten percent (10%) of the then
total assets of the Company;
D.
Possess Company property or assign the rights of the Company in
specific Company property for other than a Company purpose; or
E.

Admit a person as a Member, except as otherwise provided in this

Agreement.
9.5
Powers of Members. No Member, who is not also a Manager, shall have any
power to do any act on behalf of the Company. Nor shall a Member, who is not also a
Manager, participate in the control in whole or in part of any internal or external affairs of
the Company unless authorized by both this Agreement and by the Act.
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9.6
Managers' Time. The Managers shall devote such of their time to the
business of the Company as they may, in their sole discretion, deem to be necessary to
conduct the Company's business. The Managers shall not be required to devote their full
time to the Company's business.
9.7
Compensation for Managers. The Managers may receive reasonable
compensation as Managers, officers, directors or employees of the Company or any
subsidiary of the Company or any entity in which the Company owns an interest, but in no
event to exceed compensation ordinarily paid for comparable services rendered by unrelated
third parties in similar businesses. The initial annual salaries to be paid to the Managers
shall be: Marion Vaughn - $25,000.00; Jane Johnson - $25,000.00; Tom Sieg - $25,000.00;
and Michael G. Davis - $25,000.00. Salaries-may-bexha^
bonuses may be
awarded from time to time by the affirmativevotej)f.a majority of the Managers; provided
that such action will require the affirmative vote of Tom Sieg until all distributions to Tom
Sieg provided for pursuant to Section 8.LB throughout the term of the Company have been
made. Such salaries shall be prorated and paid in accordance with the Company's regular
payroll.
9.8
Reimbursement. The Managers shall be reimbursed for all out-of-pocket
expenses for all services, goods and materials used for or by the Company. All expenses of
the Company shall he hilled directly to and paid by the Company

The Manager* shall he

reimbursed for any administrative expenses including salaries, rent, travel expenses, and
other items generally within the purview of furthering the Company business (which shall be
deemed to include the business of any subsidiary of the Company and any entity in which the
Company owns an interest) as and to the extent provided in the travel policies adopted by the
Company, its subsidiary or other entity, as applicable.
9.9
Establishment of Reserves. The Managers shall establish an operating reserve
for the Company to provide for contingency expenses, repairs and other matters as may be
required to maintain, protect and preserve the Company's property.
9.10
Exculpation. The Managers shall not be liable to the Company or to any of
its Members for honest mistakes of judgment or for losses due to such mistakes or to the
negligence, dishonesty or bad faith of any employee or agent of the Company; provided that
such employee or agent was selected, engaged or retained by the Managers as authorized by
the Company with reasonable care. The Managers may rely upon the advice of legal counsel
to the Company in determining what acts or omissions are within the scope of authority
conferred by this Agreement. The Company shall indemnify and hold harmless the
Managers and their agents from and against any loss, expense, damage or injury suffered or
sustained by them by reason of or in ftirtherance of the interest of the Company, including,
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but not limited to any judgment, award, settlement, reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs
or expenses incurred in connection with the defense of any action or threatened action,
proceeding or claim, provided that the acts, omissions, or alleged acts or omissions upon
which such action or threatened action, proceedings or claims are based were performed or
omitted in good faith and not fraudulently, in bad faith, as a result of wanton and willful
misconduct or gross negligence.
9.11 Conflict of Interest. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
Agreement, no Member or the Managers may be a party to, or be directly or indirectly
connected with any person, corporation or partnership with which the Company may have
dealings including, but not limited to, any contract or transaction with the Company, unless
approved by either a majority of the Managers other than those with an interest in the
contract or transaction, or by Members owning interests representing a majority of the
Percentage Interests other than those held by Members with an interest in the contract or
transaction, and in the absence of fraud, no contract or other transaction so approved shall be
thereby affected or invalidated. Neither the Company nor any of the other Members or
Managers shall have any rights in or to such dealings or any profits derived therefrom.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Managers may hold interests in, and provide services
to, other bed and breakfast inns, as long as such interests and/or services do not unduly
impair them from providing their contemplated management services to the Company. All
Managers agree to disclose all such conflicts of interest to the Company and all of the other
Managers. In the event such conflicts of interest impair a Manager from providing his/her
management services to the Company, his/her salary and share of the Management Fee shall
be reduced appropriately by a majority vote of the other Managers.
9.12 Personal Service Contract. In choosing Managers in this Limited Liability
Company, the Members are relying upon their knowledge of the character, integrity and
business acumen of the Managers. As a result, aManager's right to manage the affairs .of,
the Company is a personal service mnfrarr w i t h j ^
uJhirhJ P X ^p*-^ prnvjHprf in
Section 9.1, cannot_be assignedjo^ny^JSeiiperson or entity. In the event a Manager's
right to manage the Company is voluntarily or involuntarily assigned, except as provided in
Section 9.1, that assignment shall be void and that Manager shall be deemed to have violated
the Manager's duties under this Agreement and that Manager's management rights shall
immediately terminate.
9.13 Tax Matters Partner. A "Tax Matters Partner" shall be designated by the
Managers in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Code and to act in any similar
capacity under state or local law. All of the Members shall be required to cooperate fully
with the Tax Matters Partner in the discharge of its responsibility as such. Tom Sieg is
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hereby designated the Tax Matters Partner, and may be replaced as such by a majority vote
of the Managers.
9.14 Meetings. The Company shall hold monthly and weekly meetings for its
Managers at times and places to be established by the Managers.
ARTICLE 10. MEMBERS
10.1 Regular Meetings. The Company may hold regular meetings of the Members
as from time to time designated by a majority of the Members or by the Managers. Such
regular meetings shall be held at such time and place as designated by the Members or the
Managers, designating such meetings, as the case may be. The Company shall hold an
annual meeting at 9:00 a. m. on the first third Tuesday in the month of April at the principal
business offices of the Company (an "Annual Meeting"), or at a time an place as otherwise
designated by the Managers by notice to the Members.
10.2 Special Meetings. Special meetings of Members may be called at any time by
the Managers and must be called by the Managers upon written request of Members holding
[twenty percent (20%) or more of the Company's Interests. Written notice of such meeting
stating the place, the date and hour of the meeting, the purpose or purposes for which it is
called, and the name of the person by whom or at whose direction the meeting is called shall
be given. The notice shall be given to each Member. No business other than that specified
in the notice of the meeting shall be transacted at any such special meeting.
\l

10.3 Notice of Members Meetings. The Managers shall give written notice stating
the place, day, and hour of both regular and special meetings, and in the case of a special
meeting, the purpose or purposes for which the meeting is called, which shall be delivered
not less than (10) nor more than thirty (30) days before the date of the meeting, either
personally, or by facsimile transmission or by first class mail (postage prepaid) to each
Member of record entitled to vote at such meeting. Notice of any meeting of Members,
annual or special, shall be given addressed to the Member at the telephone number, facsimile
number or address of such Member appearing on the books of the Company or given by the
Member to the Company for the purpose of notice. If no address for a Member appears on
the Company's books or is given by such Member, notice shall be deemed to have been
given if sent by mail to the Company's principal executive office and the last address for
such Member, known to the Company. If mailed, such notice shall be deemed to be
delivered when deposited in the United States mail, addressed to the Member at the
Member's address as it appears on the books of the Company, with postage thereon prepaid.
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If transmitted by facsimile transmission, the notice shall be considered delivered upon
completion of the transmission by the sender.
If any notice addressed to a Member at the address of such Member appearing on the
books of the Company is returned to the Company by the United States Postal Service
marked to indicate that the United States Postal Service is unable to deliver the notice to the
Member at such address, all future notices or reports shall be deemed to have been duly
given without further mailing if the same shall be available to the Member upon written
demand of the Member at the principal executive office of the Company for a period of one
(1) year from the date of the giving of such notice. A certificate or an affidavit of the
mailing, transmission or other means of giving any notice of any Members' meeting shall be
executed by the Managers or any transfer agent of the Company giving such notice, and shall
be filed and maintained in the minute book of the Company.
10.4
Voting. .Except as otherwise expressly proving j n this Agreement, all
matters which call for a votejocsoasent of die Membeis shall"be bv the conetifFenee-of
"Members ownin^jpore tfo,P

fift

y p a r e n t rtO%) of the Wn^TterczntoQeJInteTests

rgprftsfinf;ed_.

by the then outstanding Interests owned bv the then Members, except as .otherwise specified
in this Agreement. Thp v o f p o f ftar.h Member who is entitled to vnte shall he weighted haspri
on that Member's Capital Armnnr intprp<?t, in comparison to all other Capital Account
interests of those M»mhfir.s entitle to vote. ,A formal meeting of the Company shall not be
required. In the event, however, that a meeting of the Members is called, written notice of
the time and place thereof shall be given to each Member at least ten (10) days prior thereto.
At such meeting, a Member may be represented in person or by written proxy.*
10.5 Waiver of Notice. If, under the provisions of the Act, the Articles of
Organization, or this Agreement, notice is required to be given to a Member or to the
Managers, a waiver in writing signed by the person or persons entitled to the notice, whether
made before or after the time for notice to be given, is equivalent to the giving of notice.
10.6 Quorum. A majority of the Member's Interests of the Company entitled to
vote, represented in person or by proxy, shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of Members.
A Member shall be deemed to be personally present at a meeting if such Member is able,
through telephonic or other means, to hear all persons attending such meeting, and such
person's voice may be heard by all persons attending the meeting. If less than a majority of
the Member's Interests are represented at a meeting, a majority of the Member's Interests so
represented may adjourn the meeting from time to time without further notice. At a meeting
resumed after any such adjournment at which a quorum shall be present or represented, any
business may be transacted which might have been transacted at the meeting as originally
noticed.
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10.7 Proxies/Power of Attorney. At all meetings of Members, a Member may vote
in person or by proxy executed in writing by the Member or by the Member's duly
authorized attorney in fact. Such proxy shall be filed with the Company before or at the
time of the meeting. No proxy shall be valid after eleven months from the date of its
execution, unless otherwise provided in the proxy.
10.8 Travel Expenses. The Company will reimburse any Members whose primary
residence is outside the State of Utah for travel to the Annual Meeting to the extent and in
such amounts as are provided for travel generally on Company business in the travel expense
reimbursement policy established by the Company or its subsidiary.
10.9 Voting Entitlement of Members. Each_Mfimher shall he_entitled to vote the
Final Percentage Interests shown as issued and outstanding in the Member's name on the
j3QQks_3nQ records £>t f h p rnmpnny

ARTICLE 11. TRANSFER OF COMPANY INTERESTS
11.1 Transfer Restriction.
A:
Tr-arefer-ProfrRrt-CT^
shall sell, assign, gift, mortgage.
1
1
_XJHfflv, w ^ m W , alrnaf ! Iivpflli" Hi" "i '^^^TI^^t^MfHMiy manner whatsoever, whether by
operation of law or otherwise, transfer Interests or any interest in Interests, except as
* provided ™ th^ tt^T>yp+T* frEfttwitVigfflTiriinor thr fnrr>.gning j a M^|II1IM T jimy i p p ^ J W *

portion or all of his/her Interest to a family limited partnership or a family limited liability
company controlled and managed by the Member without the consent of the other Members
and without triggering an option or right of first refusal described in Article 11; provided
that the Interests will remain subject to this Agreement, and any subsequent transfer, sale,
etc. by the transferee to anyone other than the Member shall be subject to the terms of this
Article 11. Also, upon the death of a Member, the deceased Member's Interest may be
transferred to one or more beneficiaries under the deceased Member's will, or to one or
more heirs of the deceased Member, without the consent of the other Members and without
triggering an option or right of first refusal described in Article 11; provided that the
Interests will remain subject to this Agreement, and any subsequent transfer, sale, etc. by the
transferee to anyone shall be subject to the terms of this Article 11. All such permitted
transferees may be required to execute a copy of this Agreement or an amendment indicating
their agreement to abide by its terms.
B.
Transfer Void. Any transfer by a Member of Interests or any interest
in Interests, except as provided in this Agreement, shall be null and void, and the Company

shall not recognize or give effect to such transfer on its books and records, or recognize the
person or persons to whom such transfer has been made as the legal or beneficial holder
thereof.
C '' ' Prohibition of Grant of Voting Right, No Member shall give any
proxy or enter into a voting trust agreement or any other type of agreement vesting another
person with authority to exercise the voting of any or all of the Interests held by the Member
or giving of consent in lieu of vote with respect to such Interests, unless such other person is
a Member, or unless otherwise permitted by this Agreement or by unanimous agreement
among the Members. No proxy, voting trust or other agreement given or entered into in
violation of this Section l l . l . C , nor any vote cast or consent given pursuant thereto shall be
recognized or given effect by the Companj
112

1 r jggerin^ _>c tl ^ ^ . . _ ,... _ .d Inter ests

A.
Triggering £vt ;
'. pon any of the following events (collectively
"Triggering Events" and generically a "Triggering Event"), the Affected Member (as'
hereinafter defined) or the Affected Member's estate, trustee, purchaser, guardian, or
conservator, or other person owning or holding the Affected Interests, as applicable, shall
sell the Affected Interests, as hereinafter defined, to the other Members or the Company on
the terms and subject to the conditions set forth herein:
.
..._
__
m

.."•••:.. Interes

The receipt by me Company of actual notice ci a cluster ot
iolation of Sectr^ '* ^ A of this Agreement;

(2) ' The receipt r\ the Campari; .;r a ::cAict of an intended voluntary
transfer pursuant to Section . l 2,E ci this Agreement, unless the transfer is
exempt pursuant to Sectio;
(3)
The receipt by 'the Company of actual notice of a transfer of
Interests by operation of law to any person other than the Company (such as
but not limited to a Members trustee in bankruptcy, a purchaser at any
creditor's or court sale or the .guardian or conservator of an incompetent
Member), unless the transfer is exempt pursuant to Section 11 1, A.
B.' ' Notice of Transfer. If a Member intends to transfer Interests of which
he is owner to any person other than the Company, he shall give 60 days written notice to
the Company and the other Members of his intention to transfer. The notice, in addition to
stRting the fact of the intention to transfer Interests, shall state (1) the number or percentage
of Interests to be transferred, (2) the name, business and residence address of the proposed

transferee, (3) whether or not the transfer is for a valuable consideration, and if so, the
amount of the consideration and the other terms of the sale. At any time prior to the closing
of any sale of Interests subject of a notice given under this paragraph, if the Company,
through the Managers, so agrees, the Member giving notice under this paragraph may
rescind such notice of proposed sale, and elect to continue to hold such Interests subject to
this Agreement.
C.
to the following:

Affected Interests. The term "Affected Interests" shall mean and refer

(1)
In the case of a transfer of Interests in violation of Section
11. LA, the Affected Interests shall be the Interests so transferred.
(2)
In the case of giving of a notice of an intended voluntary
transfer pursuant to Section 11.2.B, the Affected Interests shall be those
specified in the Notice.
(3)
In the case of a transfer of Interests by operation of law to any
person other than the Company (such as but not limited to a Member's trustee
in bankruptcy, a purchaser at any creditor's or court sale or the guardian or
conservator of an incompetent Member), the Affected Interests shall be the
Interests so transferred.
D.
to the following:

Affected Member. The term "Affected Member" shall mean and refer

(1)
In the case of a transfer of Interests in violation of Section
11.1.A, the Affected Member shall be the Member who owned the Affected
Interests immediately prior to the transfer.
(2)
In the case of giving of a notice of an intended voluntary
transfer pursuant to Section 11.2.B, the Affected Member shall be the Member
who owns the Affected Interests.
(3)
In the case of a transfer of Interests by operation of law to any
person other than the Company (such as but not limited to a Member's trustee
in bankruptcy, a purchaser at any creditor's or court sale or the guardian or
conservator of an incompetent Member), the Affected Member shall be the
Member who owned the Affected Interests immediately prior to the transfer.
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E
Options and Rights to Acquire interests. Options and other nghLs io
acquire Interests shall be deemed included in the term Interests for all purposes of this
Agreement, except that the purchase price of any option or other right to acquire Interest as
determined pursuant to Section 11 5 shall be reduced by the exercise price of such option or
other consideration which is required to be given to obtain ownership of Interests pursuant to
the option or other right, and by the value of any deferral, restriction or other impediment to
the exercise of such option or other right. Interests acquired after a Triggering Event
pursuant to an option or other right to acquire Interests which is owned by a Member as of
the date of the Triggering Event, shall be deemed included in the Interests owned by the
Mem be i as of the date of the Triggering Event.
Il I

Dpiiuib and Pufiiuse Obligations

Purchase Option of Company, Within 60 days of a Triggering Event,
the Company may exercise an option to acquire the Affected Interests; (the "Company
Option")
L>
I nuiarv UP Hon lu Purchase, it the Company fails LL exercise its
option pursuant to Section 1II ,3 A, within 70 days of the Company's receipt of notice of a
Triggering Event, each Member other than the Affected Member (a "Remaining Member")
may exercise an option to purchase that proportion of the Affected Interests which equals the
proportion which the number of the Interests owned by each such Remaining Member at the
time of the Company's receipt of said notice is of the total number of the Interests then
owned by all such Remaining Members. 'The purchase option granted in this Section is
sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Primary Option,"
l
Secondary Option to Purchase. If a Member does not exercise the
Member s Primary Option to purchase such Interests, each other Member who is granted and
who exercises a Primary Option may within ten days after the expiration of the option period
provided for in Section 11.3.B exercise an option to purchase Affected Interests with respect
to which Members have failed to exercise their Primary Option (hereinafter "the Option
Interests'1). In the case of a single other Member, his option shall be to purchase any oi ail
of the Option Interests. In the case of two or more other Members, each other Member's
option shall be to purchase any or all of the number of Option Interests which bears the same
proportion to the total number of the Option Interests as the number of Interests owned by
each such other Member at the time of the Triggering Event bears to the total number of
Interests then owned by all such other Members, provided that all other Members may bv
agreement among themselves determine the proportions in which some or all of their number
may exercise the option granted in this Section 11.3.C. The Purchase Option granted by this
Section is sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Secondary Option."
1
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11.4

Exercise of Options.

A.
The Company, if it exercises the Company Option or the Members who
exercise the Primary Option and/or Secondary Option granted in Section 11.3.Borll.3.C,
shall do so by delivering written notice of their exercise of the options within the time
periods provided in said Sections to the transferee in case of a Triggering Event under
Section 1L2.A.(1); to the proposed transferor in case of a Triggering Event under Section
11.2.A.(2); and to the Company and the Remaining Members in all of said cases.
B.
A transferee of Interests in case of a Triggering Event under Section
11.2.A.(1), a proposed transferor in case of a Triggering Event under Section 11.2.A.(2), a
transferee in case of a Triggering Event under Section 11.2.A.(3), and in any case the
Affected Member, when living and having the requisite legal capacity, as a Member or
Manager of the Company or both, shall vote in favor of the Company's exercise of the
purchase options granted to it by this Agreement at any meeting of Members called for such
purpose, unless the purchase by the Company of Interests to which the option relates would
be illegal.
11.5
2

Purchase Price.

A. General. The purchase price of an Interest subject to an option or
obligation for the purchase or sale thereof due to a voluntary transfer described in Section
11.2.A.(1) or Section 11.2.A.(2) of this Agreement shall be that price agreed to by the
transferring Member and the proposed transferee, and it shall be paid according to the same
terms and conditions as those accepted by the transferring Member (e.g. a right of first
refusal). If the proposed purchase price is reduced or the payment terms change, it shall be
deemed to be a new offer, and the Member proposing the transfer must send a new notice
pursuant to Section 11.2.B.

Thejgurchase price of an Interest subject to an optionjoii^igatioiijp thp purchase
j)r sale thereof due to anig^ohinfaiy irapsfef, ff^cribed in Section 11.2.A.(3) under this
^Agreement shall he thadaook vain** of foe Tnterest^n the last day of thejmost recently
^OfnpWpH TTjpnfo pno r to the date of the Triggering Event.
'
B. How Computed. The book value of the Interest will be determined from
the Company's internally prepared financiaTllaterneiifs by the Managers, lne D Q Q £ J 5 S J ^ 9 £ ^
the Interest shall belhe net book value of the Interest, based on the information shown on the
Tympany's hooks on the lasr day nt rhp-mrmfhfrnrhna-mnsrrpppnfiy h^tpre thejlarilTf the'
Triggering Event. The book value of the Interest shall be determined in accordance with the
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inancial statements prepared i^Lthe Company .and 111 Accordance with general IIv
.accounting principles consistently applied
Dispute Resolution. If any purchasing or selling party does not agree
with the book value nfjh*Camj\*T\y as detefmi^gtf-fa^rrhp^faffSffprs, me i£ihe42urchase
prieefis t^^gSsgdCgn^ebook value,the party maydemand an audit of thg 2mpany,
which audit shall be conducted by the Hfnl of independent certified publicaccountants
regularly employed by the Company to provide the annual audit of the Company, or if none,
by an independent firm of certified public accountants chosen by the Managers. The cost of
such audit shall be borne by the party requesting the audit, unless such audit results in a
change in the purchase price of the Affected Interest of over ten percent (10%), in which
case the cost of the audit shall be borne by the Company. The Company will provide such
data as the independent firm of certified public accountants deems necessary or useful to
make such determination of the fair market value of the Interest. •
11 1 6

F ledse of Interests Prohibited.

No Member shall encumber or use any of his Interests as security for any loan,
except upon the written consent of all of the parties to this Agreement.
11J

Pav merit of the P urchase Price.

Right of First Refusal. The purchase price to be paid in the event of
exercise of a right of first refusal option triggered by an event described in Section 11 2 A.(i)
oi: Section 11,2. A. (2) shall be paid according to the same terms and conditions as those
accepted by the transferring Member.
Deferred Payment. The purchase price for Interests shall, at the option
of the payor of the purchase price, be deferred and paid in equal monthly installments over a
od of five (5: years., and the following shall apply:
(1)
1 'romisson Note, The deferred portion of 'the price shall be
evidenced by the promissory note of each purchasing party made payable to the order
of the selling party. The note of a purchasing party shall be for term of 5 years at the
Applicable Federal Rate as published by the Internal Revenue Service determined at
the date of the making of the note and be in form,, provided b> the Company.
(2)
No Security for Company. If the maker of the note is the
the note shall be unsecured,
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(3)
Pledge bv Member.
If the maker of the note is a
Member, the note shall be secured by the Member's pledge, to the payee of the note,
of the Interests purchased plus any Interests he owns.
11.8

The Closing.

A.
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the closing of the sale and
purchase of Interests shall take place at the general offices of the Company, on a date not
later than one hundred forty (140) days following the date of the Triggering Event.
B.
Upon the closing of the sale and purchase, the selling and purchasing
parties shall execute and deliver to each other the various documents which shall be required
to cany out their undertakings hereunder including the payment of certified funds, the
execution and delivery of notes and execution and delivery of assignments of Interests.
C.
The sale and purchase of Interests which the Remaining Members are
to purchase shall take place immediately prior to the sale and purchase of Interests, if any,
which the Company is to purchase.
D. Upon the closing of the sale and purchase of Interests, all Members who
are parties to this Agreement, hereby agree and consent that upon the sale and purchase of
Interests governed by this Agreement, the Company shall split its taxable year into separate
periods as required or as may be deemed appropriate by the Managers to comply with
applicable regulations of the Internal Revenue Service regarding allocations of income and
loss for the year in which any such sale and purchase occurs.
E.
No transfer by a Member shall dissolve this Company. Any proposed
transferee prior to any transfer of an interest in the Company shall have full right to inspect
the Company books and records and to obtain access to any information or account of the
Company's transactions.
11.9 Substitute Member. No person taking or acquiring by whatever means,
including by purchase, the Interest of a Member in the Company shall be admitted as a
Substitute Member in the Company unless and until:
A.
Members owning Interests representing at least fifty percent (50%) of
the Final Percentage Interests represented by the then outstanding Member's Interests
approve in writing the admission of such person as a Substitute Member. The requirement
of this Section 11.9. A. shall be waived for transfers on death of a Member to the deceased
Member's beneficiaries or heirs;

~*
Such transferee or assignee- agrees in writing to be bound fav the terms
and conditions of this Agreement; and
ill Members execute .and acknowledge such documents as are
necessary to comply with 'the requirements1 of the Act. Until such time as such conditions
have been satisfied, such assignee or transferee shall be entitled only to the rights and
benefits as are presently provided in Section 48-2b-131(l) of the Act. The Transferee of
such interest shall not be a Member with respect to such interest, and, without limiting the
foregoing, shall not have the right to vote as a Member, inspect the Company's books, act
for or bind the Company, or otherwise interfere in its operations... Such assignee or
transferee shall pay all costs and expenses incurred by the Company in connection with such
admission or substitution including, but not limited to, all legal and accounting fees, and the
costs of preparing, filing and recording any amendments to the Articles of Organization
1 1 10 Additional Restrictions. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 11 above, a
!>i feiTibec" may only sell, assign, or otherwise transfer any Interest in the Company if:
(I )
I lie proposed transfer will not result in 'the termination of the Company
as provided in Section 708(b) of the Code, or otherwise adversely affect the Company's
status as a Company thereunder. The Members are expressly authorized to enforce this
provision by notifying the Selling Members that all transfers or assignments will be
__
suspended for a period of up to twelve (12) months whenever Company Interests represeiiting
aggregate Interests of thirty five percent (35%) or more in Company capital or revenues shall
have been effectively transferred in any twelve (12) month period;
.icfi Selling Member and 'the Member's purchaser, transferee or
assignee execute such instruments of transfer and assignment with respect to such
transactions as arv :r. *.\-rn and substance satisfactory to the non-selling Members; and
B
I he assignor or transferor delivers to the Company an opinion of
counsel, in form,, a\en-abie to counsel to the Company; that:
i!l t>c\rra\ ,

J

u.c: r u n u s e d Liaiiiiicr UL avii"inin nl 1 ml! Iliiiii leM c o m p l i e s ••• h
-:.!*•* 'v*- r,r»d repiilafr^is, in./!!!'i!:i" I"!,!" :\"" m ••!,',', ,Vr of 1^11, - „

(2) the proposed transfer or assignment will not affect the a**ailabu::y
to the Company of the exemption from registration of 'the interest provided ^ insecurities Act of 1933 or any Rule or Regulation promulgated by the Securities a *
Exchange Commission or the similar exemption from, registration under the ~ec\:i
laws of any applicable state.

In the event of a transfer of a Member's Interest, if it is in the best interest of
the Company to do so, the Company may make an election, as provided for in Section 754
of the Code, to adjust the basis of the Company assets.
ARTICLE 12. CESSATION OF A MEMBER
12.1 Death. Incompetence or Bankruptcy of a Member who is a Natural Person.
Upon the death or legal incompetency of a Member or upon the filing of a bankruptcy by a
Member, the Member's guardian, trustee, or personal representative (as the case may be)
shall have all of the rights of a Member, as the case may be, for the limited purpose of
settling or managing the Member's estate, and such power as the decedent or incompetent
possessed to constitute a successor as an assignee in making application to substitute such
assignee as a Member. However, neither the guardian, trustee or personal representative nor
the Member's assignee shall have the right to become a Substitute Member unless the
requirements of Section 11.9 hereof are met.
12.2 Bankruptcy. Dissolution or Cessation of Member Other Than a Natural Person.
Upon the bankruptcy, insolvency, dissolution or other cessation to exist as a legal entity of a
Member, not an individual, the authorized representative of such entity shall have all of the
rights of a Member for the limited purpose of constituting a successor as an assignee of its
Interest in the Company and such power as such entity possessed to constitute a successor as
an assignee of its Interest in the Company and to join with such assignee in making
application for such assignee to become a Substitute Member. However, neither the
guardian, trustee or personal representative nor the Member's assignee shall have the right to
become a Substitute Member unless the requirements of Section 11.9 hereof are met.
ARTICLE 13. DISSOLUTION AND WINDING-UP
13.1 Dissolution and Termination of the^Comoany. The CompanyjfaalLbe dissolved—
and terminated upon the happening of any of the"following:
A.

At the time specified in this Agreement;..

B-

By written agreement of all ofjthe Members:

C.

Subject to Section 13.7, upon the withdrawal of a Member; or
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p
When the Company is not the successor or survivor entity in any
merger or consolidation belweeujLe Conipafiy^nd^^one (I) or more other entities^
13.2 Event of Withdrawal. A Member will cease to be a Member and will be
deemed to have withdrawn from the Company upon the happening of any of the following
events:
A.
Upon the retirement or resignation of a Member or upon the occurrence
of any other event that terminates the continued eligibility for membership of a Memb
Resignation will occur upon giving sixty (60) days advance written notice In writing to all die
Remaining Members of the Member's intent to resign as a Member of the Company
B.

In the case of a Member who is a natural person.
(1) the Member's death; nr

(2) the entry ot an order by a court ot competent jurisdiction
adjudicating the Member incompetent to manage the Member's person or estate.
C
In the case of a Member who is acting as a Member by virtue of being
a trustee of a trust, the termination of the trust, but not merely the substitution of a new
trustee.
' ———————————— — - — — —
D.
In the case of a Member that is a separate partnership or limited
liability company, the dissolution and commencement of winding up of the separate
partnership or limited liability company. Further, in the case of a Member that is a separate
partnership or limited liability company, the transfer of any portion of the beneficial
ownership of the partnership or limited liability company to persons other than one ot liie
Managers or the spouse or lineal descendants of a Manager or an entity wholly beneficially
owned bv a Manager or a Manager's spouse or lineal descendants.
E.
In the case of a Member that is a corporation, the filing of a certificate
of dissolution, or its equivalent, for the corporation or the revocation of its charter.
F
In the case of an estate, the distribution by the fiduciary of the estate's
entire interest in the Company
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G.

The Member:
(1) makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors;
(2) files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy;
(3) is adjudicated as bankrupt or insolvent;

(4) files a petition or answer seeking for the Member Readjustment,
^liquidation, dissointion7 orSimilafrelief underany statuteTTawTor regulation; ^
(5) files an answer or other pleading admitting or failing to contest the
material allegations of a petition filed against the Member in any proceeding described
in Subsection 13.2.G.(4); or
(6) seeks, consents to, or acquiesces in the appointment of a trustee,
receiver, or liquidator of the Member or of all or any substantial part of the
Member's properties.
H.
If within one hundred twenty (120) days after the commencement of
any proceeding against a Member seeking reorganization, readjustment, liquidation,
dissolution, or similar relief under any statute, law, or regulation, the proceeding has not
been dismissed, or if within ninety (90) days after the appointment without the Member's
consent or acquiescence of a trustee, receiver, or liquidator of the Member or of all or any
substantial part of the Member's properties, the appointment is not vacated or stayed or in
within ninety (90) days after the expiration of any such stay, the appointment is not vacated.
13.3 Winding Up. Upon the dissolution of the Company, the Company shall
continue solely for the purpose of winding up its affairs in an orderly manner, liquidating its
assets., and satisfying the claims of its creditors and Members and no Member shall take any
action that is inconsistent with, or not necessary to or appropriate for, winding up the
Company's business and affairs. To the extent not inconsistent with the foregoing, all
covenants and obligations in this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until such
time as the Property has been distributed pursuant to this Section 13.3 and the Company has
terminated. The Members shall be responsible for overseeing the winding up and liquidation
of the Company, shall take .full account of tfie^Company's liabilities and Property, shall cause
Jthe Property to be liquidated a* promptly _aijs_jon^Stenrwith obtaining thejairlnarke,tj5lli£-^
thereof, and shall ran^p rhp pmr^fds therefroniuJaihgjxteru sutticienftherefor, to be
applied and distributed in the following order:
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A.
First, to jhejjayment andjiiscfaarflp of all nf -ths-Comnanv's debts and .
fabilitiesjo^creditors, including Members;
1!
The balance, if any, to the Members in accordant with_their Capital_
Aj:cflunts^afte/giving effect to all contributionsT^i^budons,_aprf a 11 orations for all
periods, including the adjustments required by S£^ioB-S74TLr^KCW-Each Member
understands and agrees that by accepting the provisions of this Section 13.3 setting
:01th the priority of the distribution of the assets of the Company to be made upon its
• tquidation, such Member expressly waives any right which it, as a creditor of the
Company, might otherwise have under the Act to receive distributions of assets pari
passu with the other creditors of the Company in connection with a distribution of
d^sQts of the Company in satisfaction of any liability of the Company, and hereby
subordinates to said creditors any such right,
1J 4 Compliance With Certain Requirements of Regulations. Deficit Capital
Accounts. In the event the Company is "liquidated" within the meaning of Regulations
Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(g), (a) distributions shall be made pursuant to this Section 13 4 to
the Members who have positive Capital Accounts in compliance with Regulations Section
1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2), and (b) if any Member's Capital Account has a deficit balance (after
giving effect to all contributions, distributions, and allocations for all Fiscal Years, including
the Fiscal Year during which such liquidation occurs), such Member shall have no obligation
" to make any contribution to the capital of the Company with respect to such deficit, arid such
deficit shall not be considered a debt owed to the Company or to any other Person for any
purpose whatsoever. In the discretion of the Members, a pro rata portion of the distributions
that would otherwise be made 10 the Members pursuant rn Section H ? R hereof mav br
A
distributed to a trust established for the benefit of the Members for the
purposes of liquidating Company assets, collating amounts owed to the Company,
and paying any contingent or unforeseen liabilities or obligations of die Company or
of the Members arising out of or in connection with the Company. The assets of any
such trust shall be distributed to the Members from time to time, in the reasonable
discretion of the Members, in the same proportions as the amount distributed to such
trust by the Company wrou!d otherwise have been distributed to the Members pursuant
to Section 13.3 hereof, or
1J
withheld to provide a reasonable reserve tor Cunip.nr liahhties
(contingent or otherwise) and to reflect the unrealized portion ot an) inuallmeni
1 li
gations owed to the Company, provided that such withheld amounts shall be
distributed to the Members as soon as practicable.

V

13.5 Deemed Distribution and Recontribution. Notwithstanding any other
provisions of this Article 13, in the event the Company is liquidated within the meaning of
Regulations Section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(g) but no Liquidating Event has occurred, the Property
shall not be liquidated, the Company's liabilities shall not be paid or discharged, and the
Company's affairs shall not be wound up. Instead, the events described in Regulations
Section 1.708-l(b)(l)(iv) as in effect at the time of the liquidation described in the previous
sentence shall be deemed to have occurred.
13.6 Return ofJCapitaL^Each MembeLShaiUeefe^ sdely tojhe assejs_ofthe
rnmpflflyjLndjbt^
after the paymentjgjfocharge^ the debts
and liabilities of the Company to the Member,_Jf such assets and property are insufficient to
return the Capital Contributions of each Member, the Memhers-shall-ka^ n^ r£C£!HI!fL
^gainst any other Member or against the Manager irrespective of suchj^mhrr's capita]
balance, be it a debit or credit balance. All distributions of Company propfiltyLupon
liquidation of the Company shall be macfe in strictLarrnr4aase^.lti the balances of individual
Mejnbers^CapitaLAccounts. However, any Member with a debit or negative balance in his
CapitaTAccount, upon the dissolution and winding up of the Company, shall not be entitled
to a distribution as to capital or his share of profits.
13.7 Continuation of Company in the Event of Withdrawal. Upon the withdrawal
of a Member, the remaining Members shall have the right to continue the business of the
Company by the affirmative vote of all of the remaining Members of the Company within
ninety (90) days following the event. In the absence of an affirmative vote, the Company's
business shall be terminated, the affairs of the Company shall be wound up and the
Company's assets or proceeds thereof shall be distributed and applied in the manner and
priority set forth in Section 13.3 above.
13.8 Winding Up of the Company. Upon a dissolution of the Company, the
winding up of the affairs of the Company and the distribution of its 2iSSQts shall be conducted
by the Members who are hereby authorized to do any and all acts and things reasonably
necessary to accomplish the foregoing. In this regard, the Members may delegate their
obligation to a receiver or a trustee.
A reasonable time shall be allowed for the orderly liquidation of the assets of the
Company and the discharge of liabilities to creditors so as to enable the Members to
minimize the losses customarily attendant to distressed dispositions of property. In
liquidating the aggers of ftr» r 9mp^^v, *w *<&*** of a saleable value which the Members
determine are not suitablejbiiafl-sqttteablc distribution shall be sold at public or private sale,
as the Members deem advisable. Any Member may purchase such assets at any such sale.
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13.9 Final Accounting. The Company shall furnish each of the Members with a
statement prepared the Company's accountant which shall set forth the assets and liabilities of
the Company as of the date of termination and which shall disclose the sources and
applications of Company zsstts and proceeds thereof during the course of winding up the
Company affairs and dissolution. Upon completion of the winding up and termination of the
Company, the Members shall execute, acknowledge and cause to be filed Articles of
Dissolution of the Company.
13.10 Method of Distribution of Assets, ic the extent feasible, all distributions in
liquidations shall be made pro rata to the Member ;~ kiry* Distribution of specific assets
shall be determined by the Members.

- BOOKS Or r ^ ^ J i . -\ r :: •: T,,)S
* V^ COMPANY P*""^ •" 14.1 Accounting Year and Method.. The Company shall adopt a calendar year for.its
financial reporting and federal income tax purposes The Company shall prepare all financial
statements and federal and state income tax report «"'.: a .- h "->o.v?
"14.2 Maintenance of Books and Records:~ftrain;r :2 VMjnngTEe^xigEHcrofThe - ~
the Members shall keep or cause - y. ;:e;-- b; \:: agenc full and true books of
in which shall be entered fully and accurately eacn transaction of the Company
iutu uuoks of account, together with a certified copy of the Articles of Organization and any
amendments thereto, shall at all time be maintained at the principal office of the Company
and shall be open to the reasonable inspection and examination of the Members or their duly
authorized representatives.

"'"~~

^ J lax Returns, ine Managers shall have the books and records of the Company
reviewed and income tax returns prepared for the Company. A report indicating the
respective Member's share of net profits or losses and capital gains or losses, all as defined
and reflected on 'the Company income tax return, shall be available to the Members within a
i - a s enable period of time after the close of the taxable year of the Company for which such
i en u ii was prepared
14.4 Bank Accounts.. Funds and monies received by the Company shall be deposited
in such bank account or accounts as the Managers shall determine. Checks or other
withdrawals from any such bant: account or accounts shall be made upon such signature or
signatures as the Managers may designate,
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14.5 Company Property. The assets and liabilities as set forth on the books and
records of the Company and such other property as may be contributed to the Company,
together with all accumulated earnings, if any, are the property of the Company. Company
property shall generally be acquired and conveyed and Company activities shall generally be
engaged in the name of the Company and not in the name of a Manager or Member. The
Members acknowledge and specifically authorize the Managers to hold Company property in
the name of a Manager as nominee for the Company if the Managers determine that holding
such property is in the best interest of the Company. The Company may, by written
agreement, engage any person to act as nominee for the Company.

ARTICLE 15. AMENDMENT
15.1 Amendment of Agreement. The Company's Articles of Organization shall be
amended whenever:
A.

There is a change in the name of the Company;

B.
There is a change in the character of the business of the Company from
that specified in the Company's Articles of Organization;
€r.

There is a false or erroneous statement in the Articles of Organization;

D.
There is a change in the time, as stated in the Articles of Organization,
for the dissolution of the Company;
E.
There is a change in the name and street address of the Managers of
the Company or if the Company is managed by its Members, there is a change in the names
and addresses of the Company's Members;
F.
The Members determine to fix a time not previously specified in the
Articles of Organization for the dissolution of the Company; or
G.
The Members desire to make a change in any of the provisions of the
Articles of Organization in order for the Articles of Organization to accurately represent the
agreement among them.
15.2 Method of Amendment. This Agreemeptinav be ameg^djn a writing signed
by-Members ownjn£jh^pp^rs"l^r^sfating percentage lnterests^Li^^ ast seventy-five ~~
percent (75%) of the Final Percentage Interests represented by the then outstanding Interests.
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16.1 16.2 Agents, Proceedings ana Expenses, ror the purposes of thL
Section 16.1, "agent" means any person who is or was a Member, officer, employee r
other agent of this Company, or is or was serving at the request of this Comparv
manager, employee, or agent of another foreign or domestic corporation, Company, u *
venture, trust or other enterprise, or was a manager, employee, or agent of foreign or
domestic corporation which was a Member of this Company. The term "proceeding"
s
any threatened, pending or completed action or proceeding, whether civil, criminal,
administrative, or investigative. The term "expenses" includes, without Limitation, attorney's
fees and any expenses of establishing a right to indemnification under Subsection 16,2 C, or
Subsection 16.2.D of this Section 16.1.
, ..J:IJ, Other Than Bv The Company The Company shaL indemnify
any person who was or is a party,, or is threatened to be made parry, to any proceeding
(other than an action by or in 'the right of 'this Company) by reason of the fact that sucn
person is or was an agent of this Company, against expenses, judgments, fines, settlements
and other amounts actually and reasonably incurred in connection with such proceeding if
that person acted in good faith and in a manner that person reasonably believed to not be
contrary to the best Interests of this Company and, in the case of a criminal proceeding, had
no reasonable cause to believe the conduct of that person was unlawful. The termination of
any proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere
or its equivalent shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good
faith and in a manner which the person reasonably believed to be in the best interests of this
Company or that the person had reasonable cause to believ e that the person's conduct was
unlawful.
Actions Bv The Companv. Ihr Company shall indemnify <u;v p-c
who was or is a party, or is threatened to be made a party, to any threatened, pending or
mpleted action by or in 'the right of this Company to procure a judgment in its favor by
reason of the fact that person is or was an agent of this Company, against expenses actually
and reasonably incurred by that person in connection with the defense or settlement of that
action if that person acted in good faith, in a manner that person believed to not be contrary
to the best interests of this Company and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. No
indemnification shall be made under this Subsection 16.2.B:
(ij In lespeci oi" any claim, issue or matter a.. ;c
sha II ha\ e been adjudged rn he liable to the Company in thA -?~*

;hat person
-e of that

person's duty to the Company, unless and only to the extent that the court in which
that action was brought shall determine upon application that, in view of all the
circumstances of the case, that person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity
for the expenses which the court shall determine;
(2) Of amounts paid in settling or otherwise disposing of a threatened
or pending action, with or without court approval; or
(3) Of expenses incurred in defending a threatened or pending action
which is settled or otherwise disposed of without court approval.
C.
Successful Defense Bv Agent. To the extent that an agent of this
Company has been successful on the merits in defense of any proceeding referred to in
Subsection 16.2 or 16.2.B, or in the defense of any claim, issue, or matter therein, the agent
shall be indemnified against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by the agent in
connection therewith.
D.
Advance of Expenses. Expenses incurred in defending any proceeding
shall be advanced by this Company before the final disposition of the proceeding on receipt
of an agreement by or on behalf of the agent to repay the amount of the advance unless it
shall be determined ultimately that the agent is not entitled to be indemnified as authorized in
this Article 16.
E.
Other Contractual Rights. Nothing contained in this Article 16 shall
affect any right to indemnification to which persons other than Members, the Managers, or
agents of this Company or any subsidiary hereof may be entitled by contract or otherwise.
16.3 Other Indemnification. The indemnification herein provided shall not be
deemed exclusive of any rights to which those seeking indemnification may be entitled under
any agreement, vote of Members (whether disinterested or not), or otherwise, both as to
action in such person's official capacity and as to action in another capacity while holding
such position, and shall continue as to a person who has ceased to be a Member or
employee, and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and administrators of such
person.
16.4 Insurance. The Company may purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of
any person who is or was a Member, Manager, or employee of the Company, or is or was
serving at the request of the Company as a member, manager, employee or agent of another
company, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise against any liability asserted against such
person and incurred by such person in any such capacity, or arising out of the person's status
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as such, whether or not the Company would have the power to indemnify such puowu
against liability.
16.5 Settlement bv Company. The right of any person to be indemnified shall be
subject always to the right of the Company by the Managers, in lieu of such indemnity, to
settle any such claim, action, suit or proceeding at the sole expense of the Company by the
payment of the amount of such settlement and the costs and expenses incurred in connection
therewith.
ARTICLE!/

MISCELLANEOUS

17 1 Notices, All notices provided for by this Agreement shall be made in writing
(1) either by actual delivery of the notice into the hands of the parties 'thereunto entitled, or
(2) by the mailing of the notice in the U.S. mails to the last known address of the party
entitled thereto, registered mail, return receipt requested. The notice shall be deemed to be
received in case (1) on the date of its actual receipt by the party entitled thereto and in the
case of (2), three (3) days subsequent to the date of its mailing.
17.2 Title and Captions. Article and Section, titles or captions contained in this
Agreement are inserted only as a matter of convenience and for reference and in no way
define, liiiiii, extend ui desaibe die scope of diis Agieemeiit ui die intent of any provision"
hereof.
173 Gender, whenever the singular number is used in this Agreement and when
required by the context, the same shall include the plural, and the masculine gender shall
include the feminine and neuter genders and the word "person" shall include corporation,
firm, company, or other form of association
11.4 Counterparts, inis Agreement may be executed in several counterparts, and all
so executed shall constitute one agreement binding on all parties hereto, notwithstanding that
all the parties are not signatory to the original or the same counterpart.
17

.5 Governing Law. This Agreement and all amendments hereto shall be governed
by the laws of the State of Utah., without reference to choice of law principles which
otherwise might be applicable
17.6 Survival of Terms and Provisions. The terms and provisions of this Agreement
•ill.ill be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the successors and assigns of the respective
1* ( in!

IT,
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17.7 Severability. The invalidity or unenforceability of any part of this Agreement
shall not invalidate or affect the validity or enforceability of any other provision of this
Agreement, which shall continue to govern the rights and obligations of the parties hereto as
though the invalid or unenforceable provisions(s) were not a part hereof.
17.8 Further Instruments. The Members agree that they will execute any and all
other documents or legal instruments that may be necessary or required to carry out and
effectuate all of the provisions hereof.
17.9 Preparation of Agreement. The Members acknowledge that they have all
participated in the preparation of this Agreement and, in the event that any question arises
regarding its interpretation, no presumption shall be drawn in favor of or against any
Member with respect to the drafting hereof.
17.10 Managers as Fiduciary. The Managers shall account to the Company and the
Members and shall hold as their trustee any profits derived from any transaction connected
with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the Company or from any use by the Managers
of Company property. Such duty extends to the personal representatives of any deceased
Manager or Member involved in the liquidation of the Company. All management,
investments, accounting and distributions shall be conducted by the Managers subject to the
obligations, duties and liabilities of fiduciaries in general.
17.11 Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes and represents the entire
agreement of the Members with respect to the subject matter hereof, and all other prior
agreements, covenants, promises and conditions, verbal or written, between the Members
relating to the subject matter hereof are incorporated herein. This agreement supersedes that
certain Operating Agreement dated May 22, 1996 between the Original Members, which this
Agreement shall be deemed to amend and replace in its entirety. No Member hereto has
relied upon any other promise, representation or warranty, other than those contained herein,
in executing this Agreement.
17.12 Waiver of Lis Pendens and Partition. The Members recognize that no
Member has any direct right in any Company property, but only an Interest in the Company
which is deemed to be personal property. Accordingly, because the Company may suffer
irreparable financial loss if a lis pendens were filed or an action for partition were brought
with respect to Company property by a Member arising out of a Company dispute, each
Member does hereby waive any such right to file a lis pendens against any property of the
Company or bring an action for partition thereof.
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17.13 Contracts. To the extent feasible, the Managers shall execute written contracts
in handling Company business. The Managers shall provide in all written contracts that the
third party acknowledges that the third party is aware that he, she or it is dealing with a
Limited Liability Company formed under the laws of Utah In addition, the contract shall
provide that the third party agrees that in any subsequent action against the Company, the
third party will proceed only against the Company, its successors and assigns.
1 1 .14 Insurance, The Managers shall have 'the right to obtain , on behalf of and at
the expense of the Company, a life insurance policy or policies on the life or lives of one or
more Members or any other persons which the Managers deem, necessary" or desirable
respecting the operations of the Company. The Company shall be the owner of each such
policy.. For each policy, if any:
!

' !::i! * d beneficiary under the policy may not be changed without
the mutual consent or the Managers.
B
A Member or Manager who is insured by an insurance policy may not
use, assign or control in any manner the economic benefit of the policy; however, the
economic value of the policy may benefit the insured, together with all other Members,
derivatively through 'the Member's ownership interest in the Company,
.5 Binding Arbitration. In "the event of any dispute between the parties hereto as
to the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement, or any other agreement entered into
pursuant to this Agreement, the dispute shall be submitted to and resolved by binding
arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators appointed and acting in accordance with the
Rules of the .American Arbitration Association then in force and effect. The decision of a
majority of the arbitrators submitted to arbitration pursuant to this provision shall be final
and binding upon the parties. The arbitrators shall be entitled to award reasonable attorneys
fees to the prevailing party
17 16 Qualification in Other States. In the event that the business of the Company is
conducted in states in addition to the State of Utah, then the Members agree that this
Company shall exist under the laws of each state in which such business is actually
conducted to the extent that it is necessary in order to do business in such state but that
otherwise the laws of the State of Utah shall govern this Company and each Member agrees
to execute such other and further documents as may be required in order to qualify the
Company to conduct its business in other states. To the extent that business of the Company
shall be conducted in another state, the Managers may, in their discretion, designate a
principal place of business and other offices in such state or states

17.17 Injunctive Relief. The Members acknowledge that violation of Article 19 of
this Agreement is likely to cause harm to the Company for which damages will be difficult if
not possible to assess, and that the harm to the Company will most likely be irreparable.
The Members therefore agree that the Company shall have the right to enforce Article 19
through an action for a specific performance, injunctive relief, damages, or any or all of the
foregoing.
ARTICLE 18. REPRESENTATIONS OF MEMBERS
The undersigned Members acknowledge that they have all participated in the
preparation of this Agreement and in the formation of the Company. In the event any
question arises regarding the interpretation of this Agreement, no presumption shall be drawn
in favor of or against any Member with respect to the drafting hereof. Each Member
represents and warrants as follows:
A. The Member has received, read and analyzed the Agreement and other
related documents.
B. The Member acknowledges and understands that the Company has no
financial or operating history and the Member's Interest as an investment involves a high.

degree of risk.
C. The Member acknowledges and understands that there will be no public
market for the Company Interests, that there are substantial restrictions on the resale,
assignment or transfer of the Company Interests and it will likely not be possible to readily
liquidate the investment of the undersigned in the Company.
D. The undersigned has sufficient net worth to bear the risk of the complete
loss of the investment of the undersigned in the Company.
E. The Member, by virtue of the Member's own investment acumen and
business experience, is capable of valuing the risks and merits of investing in the Company.
F. The Member is purchasing the Company Interests for the Member's own
account for investment purposes and not with a view to or for any distribution thereof.
G. All documents and additional information requested by the Member have
been made available to the Member.
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H. The Member is capable of bearing the high degree of economic risk
associated with the investment of the Company, including the possible complete loss of all
contributed capital and earnings thereon.
I. All the representations of the Member herein are true and accurate and the
Members of the Company may, without further investigation, rely on such representations.
J. The Member hereby adopts, accepts and agrees to be bound by all the
terms and provisions of the Agreement and to perfonn all the obligations therein imposed on
the Member with respect to the Member's Interest to be purchased.

ARTICLE 19. NONDISCLOSURE AND NONCOMPETE
19.1

Disclosure of Information.

A.. The Members acknowledge that the business of the Company involves
valuable, confidential and proprietary data, information and trade secrets of various
kinds which is called "Confidential Information" and is defined below.
B.
"Confidential Information" means any information, data or other
materials of the Company or of third parties in the possession ot the Company that is
proprietary or confidential to the Company, including without limitation any and all
such designated as Confidential Information by the Company, acquired by, disclosed
to or known by the Members as a result of or through a Members' relationship with
the Company (specifically including, but not limited to, information conceived,
originated, discovered or developed in whole or in part by the Members within either
the scope of employment hereunder or Members's prior employment with the
Company, and the technology, trade secrets and other confidential information
possessed by the Company), provided that such information, data or other materials
(a) were not known to Members prior to the commencement of Members's
employment with the Company, (b) are not and do not become known to persons
unrelated to the Company and/or publicly known through publication, inspection of a
product, or otherwise and through no wrongful act of Members, (c) are not received
or learned by Members from any third party other than that learned or received by or
through the Company, or (d) are not independently developed by Members after
termination of employment hereunder. Confidential Information may include, but is
not limited to, the following types of information and other information of a similar
nature (whether or not reduced to writing):
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(1)
any and ail non-public information relating to or otherwise
concerning the Company's actual and potential customers, suppliers and
licensors including the identities thereof, the nature of the Company's
relationships with its customers, suppliers and licensors, the business
information of the Company's actual or potential customers and the types and
amount of products acquired by customers from the Company;
(2)
sales, marketing and product development plans, marketing
techniques, price lists (non-public), pricing policies, market forecasts and sales
volume;
(3)
developments, improvements, inventions, ideas, processes,
procedures, discoveries, concepts, designs, drawings, specifications, molds,
data, technology, and "know how";
(4)
financial information, including, without limitation, product
designs and specifications, product development plans, product strategy and
product delivery systems;
(5)
product or service information, including, without limitation,
product designs and specifications, product development plans, product
Strategy and product delivery systems;
(6)
any information, not generally known, concerning.the Company
or its operations, products, personnel, finances, business relationships with
third parties which, if used or disclosed, could adversely affect the business of
the Company, or give a competitor an advantage over those without access to
the information; and
(7)
any information described above which the Company obtained
or obtains from another party who treats the information as proprietary or
designates it as Confidential Information or which is designated with a legend
indicating that it is confidential or proprietary, whether or not owned or
developed by the Company.
GENERIC INFORMATION OR KNOWLEDGE WHICH THE MEMBERS WOULD HAVE
LEARNED IN THE COURSE OF SIMILAR EMPLOYMENT OR WORK IN THE
TRADE, SHALL NOT BE DEEMED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.

-48-

C.
Except to the extent consented to by the Company or otherwise
reasonably necessary or appropriate in connection with the assertion of any of the
rights of the members under this Agreement or the Act, Members will hold in strict
confidence all Confidential Information, Members will not use Confidential
Information for any purpose, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the
Members will not:
(1)
directly or indirectly reveal, report, publish, disclose or transfer
any portion of Confidential Information to any person or entity;
(2)
assist any person or entity other than the Company to secure any
benefit from any portion of the Confidential Information;
(3)
utilize any portion of the Confidential Information in connection
with soliciting business from or providing services or products of any type to
any the Company's customers or prospective customers.
19.2 Non-interference. Because of and in consideration of (1) the extensive
knowledge of the Confidential Information provided to and possessed by Members, including
the Company's technology, know-how, customer, distributor, licensor and/or supplier lists
and the substantial investment of time and money such information represents to the
Company, (2) the personal relationships and good will fostered and intended to be fostered
between Members (on behalf of the Company) and the Company's customers, licensees,
licensors, employees, distributors and/or suppliers, and the expense incurred by the Company
in connection therewith, (3) the time and expense incurred by the Company in training
Members and supporting and encouraging the development and improvement of Members
skills, and recognizing the highly competitive nature of the Company's business, Members
will not, while Members, or for twenty-four (24) months immediately after ceasing to be a
Member, directly or indirectly interfere with, entice away from the Company or adversely
affect the Company's relationship with any customer, licensee, licensor, distributor, source
of supply or employee of the Company (whether actual or potential).
DATED: September .££,, 1997.
MEMBERS:

MARION VAUGHN
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^

r^

MICHAEL tf. DAVIS
MANAGERS:

^m

6Ju~4n<~y(

MARIONJiAUGHN

/^ANE^OHNSOfT

MICHAEL GRAVIS
197052-5
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<y.JJ^JA'y^

JANE JOHNSON

TOM SIEG

-Z)A<r*^J^. A^MANAGERS:

MARION VAUGHN

c

JANE JOHNSON

^hjrTn&SJi.

MICHAEL G. DXS
197052-5
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EXHIBIT A
MEMBERS

INITIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Marion Vaughn

$

-0-

Jane Johnson

$

-0-

Tom Sieg

$670,000.00*

Michael G. Davis

$

-0-

*To consist of real property as described herein below, at the agreed value of $1,300,000.00,
which represents the fair market value of such property as of the date hereof, less the sum of
$ ^ 1 Q hDQ encumbering such property, and the sum of $ 2^>0joo^ representing
additional liabilities of Tom Sieg incurred in the acquisition or development of such property,
and which the Company shall assume.

RNW\CORP\0102
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DAIIDAH v. CONTINENT REALTY, INC.

Fla.

997

CII«as434So.2dH7(Fte.App.3Dbl. ltS3)

Charles DAIIDAH and Jorge
Gomez, Appellants,
v.
CONTINENT REALTY, INC. and
Rodriguez Realty & Mortgage
Company, Appellees.
No. 82-2039.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District.
July 12, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 12, 1983.
Vendor and putative purchaser of certain real property appealed from a decision
of the Circuit Court, Dade County, Thomas
E. Scott, J., which awarded real estate brokers a commission. The District Court of
Appeal held that agreement between vendor and putative purchaser, who was not in
a financial position to purchase the property
after he was located by real estate brokers,
under which putative purchaser was to be
employed as a construction manager and
that vendor and putative purchaser were to
each receive 60% of the profits on the sale
of the units constructed on vendor's property after costs paid by vendor were reim-

3

Fla.

434 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ted to him And after vendor was paid a
,000 per unit fee for the land, did not
actively make putative purchaser a buyof the land so as to entitle brokers to a
imission.
Reversed with directions.
ikers •=•49(1)
Agreement between vendor and putaB purchaser, who was not in a financial
Ition to purchase the property after he
i located by real estate brokers, under
ich putative purchaser was to be emyed as a construction manager and that
idor and putative purchaser were to each
eive 50% of the profits on the sale of the
its constructed on vendor's property after
ts paid by vendor were reimbursed to
fi and after vendor was paid a $15,000 per
it fee for the land, did not effectively
ke putative purchaser a buyer of the
d so aa to entitle brokers to a commis-

Aark Dienstag, Miami, for appellants.
loger A. Bridges, Coral Gables, for aplees.
before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT
i DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
»ER CURIAM.
Charles Dahdah, the owner of certain
tperty, and Jorge Gomez, the putative
rchaser of such property, appeal from a
Igment entered against them awarding
i appellees-real estate brokers a commisn. We reverse the judgment with ditions to enter judgment for the appelits.
The facts are not in material dispute,
hdah entered into an oral agreement to
r Continent Realty, Inc. a ten per cent
nmission if the broker located a purchasready, willing and able to purchase Dahb's property for $510,000 on terms acceptIn 0e Montejo, the brokerage contract proWed for • commission upon the sale of the
foperty; here, the contract provided for a
ommUslon upon the broker procuring a pur-

able to him. Continent, through Rodriguez
Realty & Mortgage Company, another real
estate broker, brought Gomez, a prospective
purchaser, to Dahdah. Gomez was not in a
financial position to purchase the property.
Months later, Dahdah and Gomez entered
into an agreement under which Gomez was
to be employed as a construction manager,
thirty-four housing units were to be constructed on Dahdah's land, and Dahdah and
Gomez were to each receive fifty per cent
of the profits on the sale of the units, such
profits to be the amount remaining after
costs paid by Dahdah were reimbursed to
him and after Dahdah was paid a $15,000
per unit fee for the land. The brokers
argue that this agreement between Dahdah
and Gomez effectively made Gomez a purchaser of the land. We disagree.
The brokerage contract obligated Dahdah
to pay a commission only upon the broker
procuring a ready, willing and able purchaser for the property. Under the joint venture agreement between Dahdah and Gomez, no sale to Gomez was contemplated,
nor was it inevitable that Dahdah would be
able to dispose of his property. Indeed, if
the development venture were unsuccessful,
the property would remain Dahdah's. The
fact that if all units constructed were sold
at a profit exceeding $15,000 per unit, Dahdah would receive fees totalling $510,000,
his original asking price for the property,
does not convert Dahdah and Gomez's
agreement into a sale or make Gomez a
ready, willing and able purchaser. In our
view, the disposition of this appeal is controlled by the decision of our sister court in
Miller, Cowherd A Kerver, Inc. v. De Afontejo, 406 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981),
where, under nearly identical facts,1 the
court stated:
"The brokerage contract provided for a
commission upon the sale of the property.
This exclusive right of sale contract, however, did not define the term 'sale.' We
agree with the trial court that a sale did
chaser Even as the Joint venture agreement In
De Montejo was not a sale, the joint venture
agreement here did not make Gomez a purchaser.

MURRAY v. I'UIIMX
CMe M 4M So 2d 999 (Ha App. 4 Dht. 198.1)

not occur because the owner retained an
ownership interest in the property.
Rather than assuming the risk of a seller,
the owner assumed the risk of a participant in a joint venture with the potential
for losses as well as profits. As such, the
owner decided to develop the property
herself.
"The exclusive right of sale contract did
not address the situation where the owner develops the property herself in the
form of a joint venture. The exclusive
right of sale contract should be construed
against the broker as drafter of the document, [citations omitted]. Consequently, if the broker wanted a commission in
the event the owner entered into a joint
venture with other parties regarding the
property, the broker should have spoiled
that out in the contract." Id, at 1198.
Acordingly, the judgment under review
is reversed with directions to enter judgment for the appellants.
v
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Rights, duties and liabilities of a joint
venture are governed generally by principles of partnership law.
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District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fourth District.
Nov. 25, 1981.
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Martin J. Sperry, Fort Lauderdale, for
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Broker appealed summary judgment
entered by the Circuit Court, Broward
County, Raymond J. Hare, J., denying brokerage commission pursuant to exclusive
right of sale listing contract and denying
damages for tortious interference with exclusive right of sale. The District Court of
Appeal held that: (1) joint venture agreement between corporations controlled by
owner of subject property and a developer
did not constitute a "sale" pursuant to listing contract and, therefore, broker was not
entitled to a commission, and (2) absence of
entitlement to commission precluded recovery for tortious interference with the listing
contract.
Affirmed.
1. Brokers <*»57(1)
Joint venture agreement between corporations controlled by owner of subject
property and a developer did not constitute
a "sale" pursuant to listing contract and,
therefore, broker was not entitled to a commission.
2. Torts *=»12
Since broker was not entitled to commission for joint venture formed between
corporations controlled by owner of subject
property and developer, broker was also
precluded from recovering for tortious interference with the listing contract.
3. Brokers *=>46
Exclusive right of sale contract should
be construed against broker as drafter of
document

PER CURIAM.
Miller, Cowherd & Kerver, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the broker) appeals a
summary judgment denying a brokerage
commission pursuant to an exclusive right
of sale listing contract and denying damages for tortious interference with the exclusive right of sale.
(1, 2J The broker contends that the execution of a joint venture agreement between corporations controlled by the owner
of the subject property, Consuelo De Montejo, and a developer, Mr. Baratta, constituted a "sale" under the listing contract,
thereby entitling the broker to a commission. The broker also alleges that Baratta'3
actions in procuring the joint venture
agreement constituted tortious interference
with the listing agreement between the
owner and the broker. We hold that the
joint venture agreement did not constitute
a "sale" pursuant to the listing contract
and, therefore, the broker was not entitled
to a commission. Consequently, the absence of entitlement to commission precludes recovery for tortious interference
with the listing contract.

FIJ

3(B) The professional service fe<
paid whether the purchaser be s€
you or me, or by another persoi
price and upon the terms mentioi
any other price or terms accep
me. You shall also be entitled
professional service fee if said pr<
sold within 90 days from the ex
date hereof to any person, or any
ing on such person's behalf witl
you have negotiated relative to I
of said property and have given
notice thereof to the undersigned
the term of this contract.
This agreement did not provide for
mission for putting together a joir
ture.

In August 1977, Baratta contact
broker in response to its multiple list
the property and stated that he mij
interested in the property for develo
of condominium apartments. After
discussion regarding price and constr
costs, Baratta closed the discussion b;
ing that he was not interested in the
erty because the price was too high.
The owner was introduced to Baratl
the purpose of discussing financing fo
to develop the property herself. On
ber 27, 1977, prior to the expiration o
listing contract, the owner and Baratt
tered into a joint venture agreemer
develop the property.

The agreement obligated the owne
contribute her equity in the land to
joint venture. The agreement prov
that T. M. S. Corporation, with Baratta
a party named Charles P. Ferrise as pri
pals, would develop the property int
project
In November, 1976, the owner entered profitable condominium
into a six month exclusive right of sale agreement further provided that title of
land would be taken by Top of the J
contract with the broker for the sale of
vacant land owned by her on the Gait South, a joint venture consisting of Ca
Ocean Mile. The parties subsequently ex- bean Development and Investment Cor
tended this contract for another six months ration, a Florida corporation, and T. M.
ending November 15, 1977. The broker's Development Corporation, a Florida cor
commission was ten percent (10%) of the ration to be formed. The owner, her h
selling price. The exclusive right of sale band and children were stockholders of (
agreement provided:
Caribbean Development and Investmc
Corporation. The agreement further pi
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FUL

406 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES

videdjthat the parties would share equally
in all profits and losses after repayment of
contributions. ';
t

*

By warranty deed dated March 28, 1978,
the owner conveyed the property to "Top of
the Mile South/* a joint venture consisting
of Caribbean Development Corporation, a
Florida corporation, and T. M. S. Corporation, a Florida corporation.
Then the broker filed this action. The
trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the owner and Baratta. The order
Stated!
The pleadings and depositions show that
the Plaintiff was not the procuring cause
of any sa/e of the subject property and
therefore is not entitled to any commission. ' If the Plaintiff wanted a commission in the event the owner entered into a
joint venture with other parties regarding the property, it should have spelled
that-out in the contract Further, since
the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover a
commission, there is no advantageous
business relationship between Plaintiff
and Defendant, De Montejo, that could
have been interfered with by the Defendant, |Baratta.' There can be no prima
facie evidence of a conspiracy to deprive
Plaintiff of that to which it had no lawful
claim.
Although the matter of procuring cause is
irrelevant to the broker's entitlement to a
commission in this case, we otherwise agree
with the trial court We, therefore, affirm.
< The brokerage contract provided for a
commission upon the sale of the property.
This exclusive right of sale contract, however, did not define the term "sale." We
agree with the trial court that a sale did not
occur because the owner retained an ownership interest in the property. Rather than
assuming the risk of a seller, the owner
assumed the risk of a participant in a joint
venture with the potential for losses as well
as profits. As such, the owner decided to
develop the property herself.
[3] The exclusive right of sale contract
did not address the situation where the
owner develops the property herself in the
form, of a joint venture. The exclusive

right ol sale contract should be construed
against the broker as drafter of the document Nicholas v. Burs/ey, 119 So.2d 722
(Fla. 2d DCA 1960), Lindquist v. Burklew,
128 SoJ2d 261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960). Consequently, if the broker wanted a commission
in the event the owner entered into a joint
venture with other parties regarding the
property, the broker should have spelled
that out in the contract.
[4] The rationale of McEIhinney v. Betsky, 165 Pa.Super. 646, 69 A 2d 178 (1949)
supports this conclusion. McEIhinney involved a transfer to a partnership of a
business where a broker had an exclusive
listing on the business. The broker sought
a commission on the transfer of the business to a partnership. The court held:
The question is thus resolved into a reasonably simple proposition. Belsky wanted to sell his business. He hired a broker
as exclusive agent to sell it for him. He
promised to pay a commission to the broker even if he sold the business through
his own personal efforts. Instead of
making a sale and getting out of the
business, he found that he had to involve
himself even more by forming a partnership. If McEIhinney wanted a commission on the formation of a partnership, he
should have spelled that out in the contract.
The analogy of the McEIhinney case to the
present case is strengthened by the fact
that rights, duties and liabilities of a joint
venture are governed generally by principles of partnership law. See Harrell and
Sumner Contracting Company v. Peabody
Petersen Company, 646 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.
1977).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
summary judgment denying a brokerage
commission and precluding recovery for tortious interference with the brokerage contract
AFFIRMED.
ANSTEAD, MOORE and GLICKSTEIN,
JJ., concur.

COOLET INV. CO. r. JONES

Colo. 29

OUa.780 P^d 25 (Coi&App. 19*9)

COOLEY INVESTMENT COMPANY, a
Colorado corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Elizabeth M. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant
No. 37CA1764.
Colorado Court of Appeals,
Div. V.
May 4, 1989.
Rehearing Denied May 25, 1989.
Certiorari Denied Sept 11, 1989.
Vendor appealed from judgment of the
District Court of Pitkin County, Gavin D.
Litwiller, J., awarding commission to real
estate broker. The Court of Appeals, Criswell, J., held that: (1) vendor's alleged violation of parties' exclusive listing agreement did not entitle broker to commission,
and (2) vendor's transfer of property to
partnership of which he was member did
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not constitute "sale or exchange" within
meaning of agreement
Reversed and remanded.

broker, or any other person. The contract
was to be in effect until April 15, 1983, but
on September 4, 1982, defendant notified
plaintiff that she was withdrawing her
property from the market because she had
1. Brokers e»44
decided to develop it
Although vendor's cancellation of exLater, within the contract period, defenclusive listing agreement with real estate dant transferred the property to a partnerbroker may have constituted anticipatory ship in which she held an interest Plainrepudiation or material breach because it tiff then brought suit seeking recovery of
rendered broker's performance impossible, the commission called for by the agreement
such cancellation did not satisfy statutory and obtained a judgment for that amount
requirements for broker's recovery of comDefendant asserts that she is not liable
mission because recovery was dependent
to
plaintiff for a commission because (1)
on broker's finding ready, willing, and able
defendant
did not locate a buyer who was
purchaser. C.R.S. 12-61-201.
ready, willing, and able to purchase defen2. Brokers <3=>46
dant's property, and (2) the transfer of her
Vendor's transfer of property to part- property to a partnership in which she was
nership of which he was member was not a partner did not constitute a sale or ex"sale or exchange" within meaning of ex- change within the meaning of the contract
clusive listing agreement such that broker between the parties. We agree.
was entitled to recover commission; as
partner, vendor retained ownership interest
I.
in property, precluding finding that there
Section 12-61-201, C.R.S. (1985 Repl.Vol.
was transfer to another entity, and vendor
5)
provides:
only received credit for capital contribution
"No
real estate agent or broker is entiupon transfer.
tled
to
a commission for finding a purSee publication Words and Phrases
chaser who is ready, willing, and able to
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
complete the purchase of real estate as
proposed by the owner until the same is
consummated or is defeated by the refusT. Peter Craven, Glenwood Springs, for
al or neglect of the owner to consumplaintiff-appellee.
mate the same as agreed upon."
Chrisman, Bynum & Johnson, P.C., Mar- Thus, a broker is entitled to receive a comshall T. Riggs, Boulder, for defendant-ap- mission, as such, only if he produces a
pellant
purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to
acquire the property on the owner's terms.
CRISWELL, Judge.
See Heady v. Tomlinson, 134 Colo. 33, 299
Defendant, Elizabeth M. Jones, appeals P.2d 120 (1956). And, the burden is on the
from a judgment awarding a real estate broker to establish that he has met the
broker's commission to plaintiff, Cooley In- statutory requirements to receive a commission. Becker v. Arnold, 42 ColcApp.
vestment Co. We reverse.
On August 4, 1982, the parties entered 178, 591 P.2d 596 (1979).
into an exclusive right to sell listing con[1] Although we assume, without decidtract whereby defendant agreed to pay ing, that defendant's cancellation of the
plaintiff a commission for its service if (1) listing agreement constituted an anticipatoit found a purchaser ready, willing, and ry repudiation or a material breach because
able to complete the purchase of defen- it rendered plaintiffs performance impossidant's property on her terms or (2) there ble, mere proof of the owner's contract
was a sale or exchange of the property violation does not satisfy the statutory rewithin the listing period by the owner, the quirements. While such a breach of con-
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tract may be sufficient to allow the recovery of damages of another type, such as
out-of-pocket expenses and loss of anticipated profits, the statute prohibits the recovery of a commission, absent the production
of a ready, willing, and able buyer.
Here, plaintiffs representative testified
that he had discussed the sale of the property with several potential buyers and had
informed defendant of their interest in the
realty. Nevertheless, there is no evidence
that plaintiff procured a buyer who was
actually ready, willing, and able to purchase the property on the terms set forth
in the listing agreement See Horton-Cavey Realty Co. v. Reese, 34 ColcApp. 323,
527 P.2d 914 (1974). Hence, plaintiff was
not entitled to the recovery of a commission for this alleged breach of contract, and
there is no evidence upon which to base an
award for damages of another type.
II.
[2] Generally, under an exclusive right
to sell contract, if the property is sold
within the time prescribed, the broker is
entitled to a commission, irrespective of
how the sale came about. See Garrett v.
Richardson, 149 Colo. 449, 369 P.2d 566
(1962). Here, it is undisputed that defendant transferred her property to a partnership of which she was a member. Thus,
the question presented is whether that
transfer was a "sale or exchange" within
the terms of the listing agreement We
hold, as a matter of law, that it was not
Defendant withdrew her property from
sale to form a partnership with Larkspur
Mountain, Ltd. (Larkspur) for the purpose
of developing a small luxury hotel on the
site of the property. Defendant contributed her property to the partnership as her
initial capital contribution and Larkspur
contributed $75,000. Distributions were to
be made, first, to defendant to the amount
of her capital contribution, and then to
Larkspur to the amount of its capital contribution. Thereafter, distributions were
to be fifty per cent to defendant and fifty
per cent to Larkspur. Any distributions
reouired

the

unanimnnc

f»nnciaTi4- nf

partners and were to occur only if the
partnership was profitable enough to justify such distributions.
Section 7-60-106 (1986 RepLVol. 3A) defines a partnership as "an association of
two or more persons to carry on, as coowners, a business for profit" Under the statute, a partnership is not an entity separate
from its partners. Thus, because the defendant retained an ownership interest in
the property, there was only a change in
the form of ownership, not a transfer of
the property to another entity. See Miller,
Cowherd & Kerver, Inc. v. DeMontejo, 406
So.2d 1196 (Fla.App.1981); McElhinney v.
Belsky, 165 Pa.Super. 546, 69 A.2d 178
(1949).
Further, the conveyance of the title to
the property to the partnership cannot be
considered to be a "sale." See McElhinney v. Belsky, supra. Under the agreement between defendant and Larkspur, defendant received only a credit for a capital
contribution of $500,000, which represented
the market value of the property. She
received no other compensation; there was
no unconditional promise on the part of the
partnership, or anyone else, to pay her
anything; there was no security given to
her, and she was not entitled to receive
any interest payments on her capital account Defendant's only right was to receive a share of future profits, if any.
Therefore, under the facts here, the conveyance of the title to the property by
defendant to the partnership did not constitute either a sale or an exchange within the
meaning of the listing agreement. See
Miller, Cowherd & Kerver, Inc. v. DeMontejo, supra; McElhinney v. Belsky, supra.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause
is remanded with directions to enter judgment for the defendant
METZGER and HUME, JJ., concur.
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